UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITY OF RECONCILIATION,
REINTEGRATION AND AMNESTY FOR THE ENEMY
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Art of War

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 14-06-2013	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)* FEB 2010 – JUN 2013
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Understanding the Complexity of Reconciliation, Reintegration and Amnesty for the Enemy in Counterinsurgency Warfare		**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Karsten J. Haake, Major		**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301		**8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)**
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

This thesis argues for reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty as the primary means to assure a long term peace. This recognition may cause the U.S. to better prepare a comprehensive strategy for future insurgencies. Fundamentally, reconciliation is cheaper because the aggregate cost of security and conventional operations that rely on vast amounts of resources do little over the long term to change the will of the insurgent. The cost of reconciling with insurgents, disarming, reintegrating, training and possibly moving them and their families is lower than the cost of security forces and their operations over the long run. This thesis argues that reconciliation and reintegration is an essential strategy to achieving a long term nation at peace. The end state is a nation at peace with itself and its neighbors and has a vibrant inclusive political system that pre-empts violent conflict, reconciliation, and reintegration is the essential strategy to achieve it.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Reconciliation, reintegration, amnesty, insurgents, insurgency, counter-insurgency, strategic planning, Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Oman, Vietnam, Iraq,

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	**b. ABSTRACT** (U)	**c. THIS PAGE** (U)	(U)	176	**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Karsten J. Haake

Thesis Title: Understanding the Complexity of Reconciliation, Reintegration and Amnesty for the Enemy in Counterinsurgency Warfare

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITY OF RECONCILIATION, REINTEGRATION AND AMNESTY FOR THE ENEMY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE, by Major Karsten J. Haake, 176 pages.

This thesis argues for reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty as the primary means to assure a long term peace. This recognition may cause the U.S. to better prepare a comprehensive strategy for future insurgencies. Fundamentally, reconciliation is cheaper because the aggregate cost of security and conventional operations that rely on vast amounts of resources do little over the long term to change the will of the insurgent. The cost of reconciling with insurgents, disarming, reintegrating, training and possibly moving them and their families is lower than the cost of security forces and their operations over the long run. This thesis argues that reconciliation and reintegration is an essential strategy to achieving a long term nation at peace. The end state is a nation at peace with itself and its neighbors and has a vibrant inclusive political system that pre-empts violent conflict, reconciliation, and reintegration is the essential strategy to achieve it.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

AFPAK   Afghanistan Pakistan

ANA   Afghanistan National Army

APRP   Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program

AQI   Al Qaeda in Iraq

ARVN   Army of Vietnam

BCT   Brigade Combat Team

C2   Command and Communication

CAP   Combined Action Program

COIN   Counterinsurgency

COL   Colonel

CORDS   Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Program

CPA   Coalition Provisional Authority

CSPAN   Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network

DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DEAG   Development Economic Assistance Group

DLF   Democratic Liberation Front

DoS   Department of State

EDCOR   Economic Development Corporation

FATA   Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FM   Field Manual

GVN   Government of Vietnam

IIG   Interim Iraqi Government

ISAF   International Security and Assistance Force

ISI	Pakistani Intelligence Agency
JUSPAO	United States Public Affairs Office
MNF-I	Multi National Forces, Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MOD	Ministry of Defense (Iraq)
MOI	Ministry of Interior (Iraq)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other Governmental Agencies
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PFLO	Peoples Front for the Liberation of Oman
PFLOAG	Peoples Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf
PPRC	Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committee
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction teams
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
R2inC	Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict
RC East	Regional Command East
RF/PF	Reconnaissance Force/Protection Force
SAF	Sultan of Oman Armed Forces
SEP	Surrendered Enemy Personnel
SOI	Sons of Iraq
TF	Together Forward I and II
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States

USAID   United States Agency for International Development

VC/NVA   Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army

ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THE ROLE OF HISTORY

No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

— Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

This thesis argues for reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty as the primary

means to assure a long term peace. This recognition may cause the U.S. to better prepare

a comprehensive strategy for future insurgencies. The Clausewitzian imperative above

holds true, leaders need to be clear what they want in order to plan how to get it.

The following excerpt from a CNN interview with President Hamad Karzai

outlines three challenges for long term peace in Afghanistan and also answers the

applicability question of this thesis. First is the will of the current Afghan government to

solve their insurgency politically? Second is the will of external forces to support internal

capacity building and the ability to provide for long term security? Third, the host nation

government and external forces set the conditions to bring insurgents back into the

political system?

> In excerpts of the interview released Sunday, Karzai also spoke on the High Peace Council, an initiative headed by former Afghan President Buhanuddin Rabbani and tasked with boosting negotiations with Taliban insurgents.
>
> The Taliban, those of whom who are Afghans and the sons of Afghan soil, who have been driven to violence by various factors beyond their control and beyond ours caused by circumstances in Afghanistan, we want them to come back to their country, Karzai said. "They are like kids who have run away . . . from the family. The family should try to bring them back and give them better discipline and incorporate them back into their family and society . . . I hope the United States of America and our other allies will help us through good means so we can reassure the Afghan people that this partnership is staying and that Afghanistan will

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emerge out of this current transition into a better country, a better economy and a more stronger, effective state."[1]

It is now more important than ever, that leaders understand that reconciliation and reintegration are a path for insurgents to enter back into a political system. There are principles that set the conditions for successful reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty that history has taught increase probability of success in ending an insurgency. This thesis will look at some.

Leaders must know the end state of the conflict. This thesis argues that reconciliation and reintegration is an essential strategy to achieving a long term solution for peace. The end state is a nation at peace with itself and its neighbors and has a vibrant inclusive political system that pre-empts violent conflict, reconciliation, and reintegration is the essential strategy to achieve it.

<u>Why Reconcile?</u>

Paul Hughes, a member for the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has key observations on the reasons to reconcile.[2] First it is a necessary part of conflict resolution. British doctrine states that "countering insurgency requires some sort of political

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[1]CNN World, "Karzai: 'Unofficial personal contacts' taking place with Taliban," 10 October 2010.

[2]Paul Hughes is a senior program officer with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Hughes is the director of USIP's Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, having previously served as the executive director of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel and the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, having previously served as the director of Iraq programs in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations.

accommodation."[3] Reintegration is part of reconciliation where insurgents rejoin the

political process and disarm, demobilize and accept a normal life. Reconciliation

typically happens when the host government has the advantage and the insurgents have

little hope to achieve their political objectives at a sustainable cost. Reconciliation is vital

to ensuring the long term stability and is reliant on a broad range of political, economic

and security measures if it is to be successful. Reconciliation is more than simply people

laying down their guns, but it is about reaching a political decision on both sides.[4] United

States Institute for Peace current assessment in August of 2010 was that in Afghanistan

no one was yet willing to talk to one another. Hughes took this from some of President

Karzai's comments.[5] United States Institute for Peace suspects that the reconciliation

process in Afghanistan will be a bottom-up approach starting at the district level. The

reasons for this are a weak central government, the lack of a comprehensive

reconciliation plan and the tribal nature of Afghanistan that has culturally reconciled on a

tribal level and never on a national level.[6] The reason the United States is relooking

reconciliation and reintegration is because of lessons that it learned during the Al Anbar

Awakening 2006 in Iraq. It was this operational turn in Iraq that in part has raised interest

in previous U.S. experiences such as Vietnam in which reconciliation and reintegration

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[3]Ministry of Defense, U.K.. *British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency* (Warminster, England: Chief of British General Staff, 2009), 1-13.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Paul Hughes gained this impression while in Afghanistan promoting the reconciliation process.

[6]Paul Hughes, Interview by author, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Washington, DC, 14 September 2010.

programs were successful. Reconciliation in comparison to conventional operations is

exceptionally cheap in removing fighters from the insurgency.[7] According to Koch and

"[A]merican officials at the operating level that Chieu Hoi had the most favorable

cost/benefit ratio of any counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in Vietnam."[8]

Fundamentally, reconciliation is cheaper because the aggregate cost of security and

conventional operations that rely on vast amounts of resources do little over the long term

to change the will of the insurgent. The cost of reconciling with insurgents, disarming,

reintegrating, training and possibly moving them and their families is lower than the cost

of security forces and their operations over the long run. USIP has been part of the

strategic reconciliation planning, but it is not aware of any concrete plans as of

September 2010 to move the process forward.[9] USIP stresses that a reconciliation and

reintegration plan would be different for Iraq and Afghanistan because of the cultural

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[7]Broad spectrum conventional operations as part of current doctrine encompass full scale modern 21st century warfare to small scale counterinsurgency warfare. In this context conventional warfare is defined as predominantly reliant on a military force engaged in maneuver and fire power to achieve decisive effects against an identifiable enemy. In the conventional mean the enemy is defeated by death, surrender or retreat. Reconciliation falls outside of this definition.

[8]J. A. Koch, "The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971," January 1973, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R1172.pdf (accessed 25 October 2010), vi.

[9]The current ISAF Reintegration guide dated 27 June 2010 had not yet been distributed and at the time there was still high level discussion on what the reconciliation/reintegration process would look like. The Afghan government was also trying to build consensus, while at the same time working through issues how reintegration will work at the district level. Furthermore, the dysfunctional justice system is not yet ready to support reintegration. Justice administered by a tribal court in one area isn't always recognized in another province.

nature of the Afghan tribes.[10] USIP recognizes that there are significant differences culturally, religiously, and socially between Iraq and Afghanistan that will affect reconciliation and reintegration. The differences are the effects of tribalism, centralized versus decentralized governance, ethnic make-up, religious aspects of reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty, which are tied into the traditions of the different cultures. Iraq has a more developed government infrastructure and education base to implement a broad based reconciliation, reintegration program. Iraq has had a functional centralized government historically with its associated infrastructure. Afghanistan, in comparison, does not yet have the infrastructure to support centralized reconciliation and reintegration on a consistent basis.

This thesis advocates that reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty are part of a larger strategy for a long term solution to an insurgency and provides the greatest amount of stability as host nations generate civil capabilities. Therefore, military, external civilian and host nation doctrine is important to the conduct of a counterinsurgency. Furthermore, history is important to understanding the larger context from the start of an insurgency, through the development of counterinsurgency strategy to how reconciliation fits into counterinsurgency. The argument is that instead of a discrete last phase of a counterinsurgency strategy, reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty is a continuous developing process throughout the fight. Furthermore, historical case studies also teach the preferable conditions that should exist, to execute a successful reconciliation strategy.

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[10]AA811, Paul Hughes, Interview by Jan K. Gleiman, Winston Marbella, Carrie Przelski, and Karsten Haake, Washington, DC, 13 September 2010.

This thesis advocates that reconciliation planning must start earlier than the current practice. There is a need for greater in depth cultural intelligence and understanding. The military provides the security and capacity building to set the conditions for long term reconciliation. Political and military leaders must guard and preserve both the political and military will to see the success of this long term strategy.

The current challenges for the military within the reconciliation framework are that the military must understand the environmental conditions for reconciliation to work. Military and civilian leaders must understand reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty principles and reinforce principles at the tactical level consistently to achieve long term goals. Military and political leaders must work together closely to maintain flexibility to adjust to changing political landscape, but still maintain stability of the overall political system. The reconciliation phase is difficult and there are many lessons learned. The current system of education does not address key challenges to ensure consistent military support in all areas geographically or from the tactical to operational level. The challenges of the education system are as follows:

1. Not all officers know what their end states in their Area of Operations will look like.

2. Strategic and tactical continuity depends on the personality of the commander and is not systematic.

3. The current system of sharing lessons learned does not address systematic short falls. The information sharing; within theater, ensuring continuity in specific AOs, lessons from tactical to operational, across multiple civilian and military organizations, continental U.S. forces preparing to deploy and the Combatant Commanders knowledge

library exists but problematic in getting the right information to the right Soldiers at the right time.

In addition to answering the research question, it is important to describe the research methodology. This thesis will rely on primary and secondary sources of information to draw conclusions. The interview process is a vital part of that process. The interviews from numerous units, whether United States (U.S.), allied or friendly are intended to develop an understanding of history, context, and challenges. The interviews should provide some depth and insights into historical events, some of the factors that made the event happen and lessons for the future.

Once the historical and present case studies are understood, the goal is to focus more closely on the role of reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty as part of the larger counterinsurgency effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. The end result of this study is a reader who appreciates the rich history of insurgency in warfare, the role of reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty.

There is a significant amount of theory on the causes for insurgencies and the paths that they follow. Historically, reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty efforts isolate insurgents through various means. As officers look at trends within this type of warfare, some counterinsurgencies lend themselves well to promoting an understanding of causes and effects, patterns, trends and eventually lead to guiding principles.

In light of the value of history, this thesis will delve more deeply into four distinct historical areas in order to identify lessons in an attempt to make sense out of the past and answer another fundamental question of insurgencies and counter insurgencies with the focus on reconciliation and reintegration. Is every insurgency and its counterinsurgency

effort unique in its character and nature as to prevent drawing effective lessons for the future? Or, are there patterns or factors in the nature and character of insurgencies that are universal or translatable within limits to future conflicts? If there are fundamental answers to these questions, will those answers and lessons reduce the learning curve for those engaged in the counterinsurgency effort now in Iraq and Afghanistan and insurgencies yet to come? This thesis will look closely at the classical concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Then, it will look more closely at, Vietnam 1963-1974 and Dhofar 1965-1975. Furthermore, it will look at the available history and patterns of the current operating environment in Iraq 2003-2010 and touch upon Afghanistan 2003-2010. The historical lessons will be looked at in terms of:

1. How the host nation and external forces set security conditions to enable reconciliation and reintegration

2. How security forces maintain the pressure on insurgents to reconcile and reintegrate

3. How the host nation leads in the reconciliation and reintegration effort

4. How the host nation and external forces maintain unity of effort in order to see reconciliation and reintegration succeed

5. How the host nation and external forces maintain the political will to start and continue to reconcile and reintegrate

6. How to start the reconciliation process and planning for reintegration early

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE AND

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis will delve deeply into two distinct counterinsurgency case studies: Vietnam 1963 to 1975 and Dhofar 1965 to 1975. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are not unique in their principles. There are principles in the nature and character of insurgencies that are universal. This thesis will first look at the general classical principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency, development of doctrine to translate reconciliation and reintegration principles into a lens with which to study subsequent case studies. Finally, this thesis will compare the conflicts in Iraq 2003 to 2010 and Afghanistan 2003 to 2010 with the lessons from the first two case studies. These case studies are chosen, because they address reconciliation or reintegration as a fundamental component to the long term insurgency solution. They highlight some of the challenges in planning, developing and executing reconciliation and reintegration programs. They also highlight that reconciliation; reintegration and amnesty are part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign that relies on principles of host nation leadership, support by external forces, unity of command and effort, early reconciliation planning and the maintenance of the political and military will to see the strategy succeed.

Considerable amounts of secondary source analysis exist on the Vietnam and Dhofar insurgencies. In addition, there are several historians who have covered patterns, challenges, strategies and tactics for successful insurgencies and counter insurgencies. The leading scholars on the topic of insurgency are General Sir Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, Roger Trinquier, David Galula, John McCuen, and Mao Tse-Tung. They are

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today considered the classics. However, there are also new scholars who impart a more current and contemporary interpretation, drawing on historical lessons to the current insurgency environment. Some of these new leading authors are, F. W. Becket, Richard Stubbs, Steve Metz and Wade Markel. In addition, there are scholars that add vital depth to areas such as understanding bureaucracies and strategies as nations engage in counterinsurgency warfare and their risks involved such as Robert Komer, Andrew Krepinevich, and Dale Andrade.[11]

Classical Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Significant academic and practical analysis exists on classical insurgency and counterinsurgency. In this context classical insurgency refers to those in the Philippines, China, Ireland, French Vietnam, Algeria, and Malaya from 1898 to 1960. These are insurgencies studied by the early theorists from Galula, Kitson, Mao, Giap, and Thompson upon which current United States military counterinsurgency doctrine is built. Even though there are volumes of analysis on the classical conflicts, there is disagreement as to the true principles that determine successful insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. Authors disagree with each other on the role of host nation population involvement. Is the role of intelligence vital to counterinsurgency, what is its priority and how is it developed? There is disagreement about the translatability of lessons learned from one conflict to another. There is significant conflict of opinion when

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[11]Robert Komer's *Bureaucracy at War*, Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, and Dale Andrade, Westmoreland was right: Learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War works provide depth of understanding how human organization form strategies, make decisions and implement those decisions in sometime less than perfect ways.

trying to determine if past lessons on counterinsurgency were simply ignored, misunderstood, misapplied or poorly executed. For example, a 2005 counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan was of little value when grossly under resourced by both Afghan and Coalition governments. Some argue that knowing the resource constraints, the strategy should have been different and instead planned resourcing along the lines of a Dhofar insurgency. Hence, it was a poor strategy from inception. Some scholars will find fault with the chief strategy of a counter insurgent effort. Other scholars will find fault in the decision maker leading an insurgency. All of these are debatable but offer valuable views of the nature, depth and complexity of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare.

Many authors expand on the ideas of others while some highlight new and unique ways to describe the nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Mao Tse-Tung identified the guiding Marxist principles for a successful insurgency as:

1. Arousing and Organizing the People

2. Achieving Internal Political Unification

3. Establishing Bases

4. Equipping Forces

5. Recovering National Strength

6 Destroying Enemy's National Strength

7. Regaining Lost Territories.[12]

John McCuen would build on this concept with his own principles:

1. Preserving Oneself and Annihilate the Enemy

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[12]Tse-Tung, Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Dover Publications, 2005), 41-50.

2. Establishing Base Areas

3. Mobilizing the Masses

4. Seeking Outside Support

5. Unifying the Effort

6. Unity of Principle.[13]

While both appear similar they are significantly different in terms of priority. It is

interesting to see this in light of current United States Army thinking reflected in Field

Manual 3.24, *Counterinsurgency*, which largely adopts the Maoist insurgent principles.

According to scholars, the Maoist principles had considerable influence on future

insurgency; however, the degree to which there was successful direct transfer of

principles is debatable. Even Mao observes that his principles, while successful in the

Chinese insurgency, may not be applicable outside of China and that insurgents must

identify their path to success with a local strategy.[14] Thus, it reasonably follows that

principles should lend themselves to build doctrine, but that doctrine should not become

dogma. Dogma loses its flexibility to adapt a local strategy.

Others such as Mark O'Neill in *Confronting the Hydra* would frame insurgency

and counterinsurgency "themes" as, the difference between conventional warfare and

insurgency, violence and criminality, the importance of ideas and narrative, human and

social concerns, and practicalities.[15] John MacKinlay focuses more on the "how" in

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[13]John McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Harrisburg, PA: Stockpole Books, 1966), 50-82.

[14]Tse-Tung, 49.

[15]Mark O'Neill, *Confronting the Hydra* (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2009), 1-35.

counterinsurgency thinking by identifying factors that influence human behavior. These factors are that insurgencies are politically led, internationally comprised, multi-sectioned, and multi-functional in their span of capabilities.[16] David Galula wrote a "how to" counterinsurgency guide *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, which focuses on concepts such as "hot" and "cold" insurgent war, when specific tactics are appropriate and what those tactics would be. Galula's approach is very much prescriptive. He provides a list of actions to take in order to succeed militarily. That may be why his ideas significantly impacted United States Army counterinsurgency doctrine and thinking.

The weakness of this approach is that it can develop doctrine that becomes dogma and lacks in flexibility, which is a criticism of some military leaders of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Frank Hoffman argues that relying on Galula's and even Robert Thompson's ideas is misplaced in current doctrine. He states that even Galula "would be startled by the complexity of Afghanistan and Iraq and the distinctly global insurgency of the Long War."[17] It is questionable if Hoffman's argument is still valid today. Galula and Thompson's ideas although prescriptive also identify underlying principles that contribute to evolving strategies, or at least provide a good place to start Mao's struggle had global implications, whereas the conflict in Afghanistan is tied to local issues.[18] Hoffman argues that the complexity and changing nature of

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[16]John MacKinlay, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," *RAND Counterinsurgency Study Volume 5*, 2008, 48.

[17]Frank Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counter-insurgency?" *Parameters* (2007): 71.

[18]Alford, Interview.

counterinsurgency does not lend itself well to prescriptive strategies, but rather to strategies that evolve.

As case studies are explored, there is considerable weight behind arguments that both human and terrain geography and the time period in history have a significant impact on the course of any insurgency and counterinsurgency. The fact that human and terrain geography has an impact is not ignored and is expanded on later. Specifically, there is considerable thought given to the term tribalism and how this fits into its historic, cultural and current context.

It is acknowledged that geography can both enhance the capabilities of either the insurgents or government forces. Geography is as decisive for victory as it is in defeat. At times, it is the manner in which forces deal with geography that can turn critical vulnerabilities into strategic assets. An example is the Dhofar case study where initial remoteness and lack of development supported insurgent activities, but with rapid infrastructure improvements, government vulnerability became a strength not only to mass combat power, but to promote legitimacy of government through civil support projects.

In addition to geography impacting the ability to supply and affect an area of operations for a force, the time period in history can affect the external support that both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces receive. In the case of Dhofar, the human geography initially provided an advantage to the insurgents, but as the narrative changed and the government became more legitimate, the tribes became a liability to the insurgent and an asset to the government. The tribes became an asset to the host nation through the

process of reconciliation and reintegration. Thus geography plays an indirect role in reconciliation and reintegration.

It is clear that there are disagreements on the nature, principles and themes of insurgency and counterinsurgency among those that have studied classical insurgencies and counter insurgencies. Furthermore, there is disagreement fundamentally about the applicability of lessons learned from one conflict to the next. There are scholars such as Hoffman who argue that placing too much emphasis on scholars such as Kitson, Thompson and Galula fundamentally misses the point. The search for a Jominian recipe to conduct counterinsurgency is a flawed approach. The argument goes that each insurgency is so new and unique that concepts outlined in Field Manual 3.24 *Counterinsurgency* do not apply. It misses the complexity and changing nature of the conflict. The doctrine was obsolete the day it was printed. Kitson counters that doctrine provides a good starting point to develop a plan. Understanding the past, highlights some limitations.[19]

Concerning research methodology, it is appropriate to address some of the challenges of conducting interviews, the manner in which the interviews will be conducted and the types of questions that will be asked. Primarily the interviews will be conducted in accordance with guidance in "The United States Army Guide to Oral History" which is in compliance with Army Regulation 870-5, "Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures." The spirit of these documents address some of the challenges when conducting interviews, but primarily address that the history sought is accurate and that the interviewee, their safety and rights are protected

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[19]Kitson/Dhofar Veterans, Interview.

throughout the process. The nature of the research process is not to destroy the person in search of a discovery. Thus, the ethical conduct of this research is paramount.

Critical guidelines to follow for a successful interview is to plan for open-ended questions that are broad enough for the interviewee to choose how they want to answer the question, practice active listening, allow for silence for the interviewee to collect their thoughts, and do not interrupt while the interviewee provides their thoughts. The interview protocols are added to the end of this thesis along with a comprehensive list of questions. The following are the initial questions asked:

1. How does the strategy and tactic of reconciliation and reintegration affect past insurgencies and their counterinsurgency effort? What do you think?

2. Is history important to our understanding of current counterinsurgency campaigns?

3. Did you observe a reconciliation, reintegration or amnesty plan? What was it and what did you think?

4. What is your understanding of reconciliation, reintegration or amnesty and do you feel it is important as part of a counterinsurgency effort?

5. With the idea that we reintegrate movements (Reintegration) and political parties or groups did you observe any of this as part of an amnesty program? What was the outcome? Did it support counterinsurgency efforts? How?

6. With the idea that reconciliation is the act of bringing insurgents, guerillas, or the enemy back into legal society, did you observe reconciliation or a program for reconciliation? What was the outcome? Did it support counterinsurgency efforts? How?

7. How does security for the population and government factor into an amnesty program? Did you see any of those efforts? What did you think of their effectiveness overall?

8. Where there any other programs designed to "turn" or "flip" the enemy, to change their mind and support the legitimate government? How did that work? Was it part of an amnesty program?

9. What were your observations of counterinsurgency efforts to isolate insurgent groups, cause splits among insurgent groups or exploit fault lines along cultural, racial, or economic line?

10. Did you observe population control measures such as census, biometrics, checkpoints, incentives, rewards, family/tribe protection, protected villages, local security provided by local police local police? What do you think? Where they effective?

11. Do you remember your narrative, your own propaganda or insurgent propaganda with regard to amnesty, reconciliation or reintegration? Was it effective? How?

12. How well did counterinsurgency efforts address insurgent or tribal grievances? Looking back, in hind sight, was there anything missing?

13. Based on your experience, what do you think amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration should be? What should its end effect be?

14. What did you feel was the most effective part of countering the insurgency and can you provide any examples that you witnessed?

15. Are there any lessons that you have drawn from your experiences that you would share?

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND DOCTRINE - DESCRIBING THE CURRENT

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION LENS

The overall reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty processes are part of an overall political strategy. They provide for the long-term resolution of a conflict and are the most cost effective way to fight an insurgency. It is imperative that counterinsurgency efforts support movement of this process at the earliest opportune time. This has not always occurred. In most case studies the approach to reconciliation and reintegration have been evolutionary and a sequential step to providing security. Looking at history, the political reconciliation and reintegration is the primary effort in a counterinsurgency strategy.[20] Mao observed with the Chinese insurgency that "hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities"[21] Mao warns "[those who think] the question of guerilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one . . . [have] lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerilla action."[22]

In order to explore the value of history to counterinsurgency some terms used throughout the thesis need definitions. Key terms used are insurgency, counterinsurgency, amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration. The primary sources for definitions are both current British and the United States counterinsurgency manuals.

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[20]US Government, DOD, DOS, USAID, "US Government Counterinsurgency Guide" (Washington, DC, 2009), 17.

[21]Tse-Tung, 42.

[22]Ibid., 43.

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There is similarity in the definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency. However, with regards to reconciliation, reintegration, and amnesty, the United States doctrine is almost silent.[23]

The United States doctrinal definition of an insurgency according to FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency is a "movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control."[24] The British Army Field Manual "Countering Insurgency" defines insurgency as "an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control as a challenge to established authority."[25] Both definitions are similar in meaning and scope and serve as a good jump off point for insurgency.[26]

Counterinsurgency is defined by FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency United States doctrine as "military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions

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[23]This conclusion is drawn from the reading of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2006 and U.K. Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency, Volume 1 Part Ten. FM 3-24 does not define reconciliation as the British manual, it does recognize that the long term solution is for the government to eliminate the reasons not to reconcile. Reconciliation in this case is principally accepting government rule. It focuses on extremists who will not reconcile.

[24]US Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-1.

[25]Ministry of Defense, U.K., *British Army Field Manual*, 1-5.

[26]The U.S. definition is broader than the British definition. The British definition is restricted violent subversion, while the U.S. definition can also include non-violent subversion as a part of an insurgency.

taken by a government to defeat insurgency."[27] British doctrine defines

counterinsurgency as "those military, law enforcement, political, economic,

psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing its root

causes."[28] A significant variance in both definitions is the concept of "root causes." The

omission of the term may explain some key difference in counterinsurgency approach.

The definition may be the result of differing experiences by British and U.S. armies with

insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

The British insurgency experience has colonial context. The British Army has

never been large enough to maintain all of its colonies with military force alone. Britain

was in a sense forced to leverage local resources for governance, security and economic

development. Colonial governments were principally administered by the people who

lived in the colony. The British role was to ensure that colonial interests remained in line

with imperial interests. Because of the vastness of the Empire, the military option was not

always the best suited to imperial and colonial differences, and Britain was forced

because of economics to seek political, diplomatic and economic resolutions to

differences. Thus, it never had the military capability to fight insurgencies on the same

scale as the United States. The limited economic and military resources required that

British doctrine and strategy relied on the capacity of the colony or former colony in its

counterinsurgency effort. The United States, however, because of its greater military and

economic power post 1945 has been able to counter insurgencies with large numbers of

soldiers and material. The reason principally is because the United States could. The

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[27]US Army, FM 3-24, 1-1.

[28]Ministry of Defense, U.K., *British Army Field Manual*, 1-6.

basic rationale is that more resources must make success more likely than fewer

resources. More resources reduce the perception of risk to the operation. It also reduces

the political risk to the leader seeking military action. There are benefits and risks to a

resource intensive COIN effort as opposed to a smaller foot printed agile approach.

Counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine is based on U.S. capabilities as they build host

nation capabilities. British doctrine is based on host nation capabilities supported by

British capabilities. The marked difference is that British military footprint in a country

tends to be much smaller in a counterinsurgency campaign than U.S. footprint. This

reduced resource constraint has significant impacts on the conduct of a counterinsurgency

campaign. If the host nation, with the support of external military force can maintain

security, there is little impetus for reconciliation as an important strategy. Reconciliation

starts to play a greater role in a limited resource environment. This may be the reason

why U.S. and British doctrine differs.

Amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration are at times terms used indiscriminately

with the understanding that their meaning is similar. This is not the case. Amnesty is

defined as a pardon or a warrant release from punishment for an offense.[29] It is also

understood to mean a grant of pardon to an individual or group. Amnesty is distinctly a

civil function of a civilian government. The use of amnesty has both a strategic and

operational level effect on an insurgency. On the strategic level it enables engagement

without fear of long term host nation reprisals. On the operational level it provides a

means for insurgents to fall back under the law, thereby supporting and acknowledging

the legitimacy of the host nation government. It is also a fundamental component of

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[29]Dictionary.com.

reconciliation.[30] Reconciliation is the reestablishment of cordial relations between two

groups of people. It is a fundamentally strategic or operational term in the context of

counterinsurgency. For example, two political parties, tribes or insurgent militia groups

are reconciled with the legitimate government. Reintegration is the movement of minority

or insurgent groups into the mainstream of society and reintegration is an important step

to support reconciliation.[31] The effects of reintegration because it is conducted at brigade

level and below is primarily tactical, while the effects of reconciliation are strategic and

nationwide.[32]

      The "International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) Reintegration Guide"

defines reconciliation as the insurgent movement as a whole reaching an accommodation

with Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to bring the insurgency to an end.[33] It

defines reintegration as the process by which insurgents individually or as part of a group

leaves the insurgency and rejoins their communities peacefully. The political interests of

the former insurgents are accommodated through their inclusion in the Afghan political

process. Instead of violence, there is a political mechanism by the host nation to address

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[30]ISAF, Force Integration Cell HQ, *ISAF Reintegration Guide* (NATO/ISAF, 27 June 2010), 6-8.

[31]Ministry of Defense, U.K., *British Army Field Manual*, 1-13.

[32]ISAF 27 June 2010, 4.

[33]NATO took command and co-ordination of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. ISAF is NATO's first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF operates in Afghanistan under a UN mandate and will continue to operate according to current and future UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. ISAF's mission was initially limited to Kabul. Resolution 1510 passed by the UNSC on 13 October 2003 opened the way to a wider role for ISAF to support the Government of Afghanistan beyond Kabul.

grievances at national or local level on a continual basis. Former insurgents that

participate in the reconciliation and reintegration program can take part in this process.

The Reintegration guide is specific in that both reintegration and reconciliation "must

follow an Afghan lead, enabled by the International Community."[34]

Figure 1.   Spectrum of Conflict Handling Mechanisms

Source: Hiskias Assefa, "The Meaning of Reconciliation," European Platform for
Conflict Prevention and Transformation.

Figure 1 illustrates that force is applicable for conflict suppression within an

environment of low mutual participation. Force is principally reactive in nature.

Reconciliation, however, is principally proactive in nature reducing future violence

through conflict prevention and transformation. It relies, however, on a high level of

mutual participation. Thus, the costs of setting the conditions for mutual participation are

higher. The rewards of long term conflict prevention, political and economic stability are

increased as well.

[34]ISAF, 27 June 2010, 4.

Reconciliation has five interrelated themes. First, reconciliation develops a shared vision of an independent and fair society. Thus it is a search for truth and justice, forgiveness and healing. Second, reconciliation is about acknowledging and dealing with the past. Actors in a conflict must look critically at their own role in the conflict in a constructive way. Third, reconciliation is about building positive relationships. This theme addresses the building of trust, reduction of prejudice and intolerance. The theme revolves around embracing differences in a multicultural, multi ethnic society. Finally, reconciliation is about significant cultural and attitudinal change. The aim is to break the culture of suspicion, fear, mistrust and violence. The theme focuses on human rights and the development of a sense of ownership by all citizens in a political process based on respect.[35]

Department of State Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

According to the United States Department of State's *Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations*, reintegration is broken into two distinct phases. They are reinsertion in the short term reintegration in the medium. Reintegration is defined as "The short to medium period of time that refers to an ex-combatant's re-entry into civilian life." This period is often marked with a package of benefits to assist in the transition from military to civilian life. The goal of short-term reinsertion assistance is to keep ex-combatants off the streets and to break command and control structures between the rank and file and commanders. Reintegration in the long term is defined as "A longer-term

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[35]Research Team, *Reintegration and Reconciliation-Theory and Practice* (Warminster: Land Warfare Development Group, 2010), 10.

perspective on an ex-combatant's re-entry into civilian life. The goal of long-term reintegration is sustainable livelihoods that help promote peaceful and secure communities. Long-term reintegration helps ex-combatants become socially and economically embedded in their communities."[36]

The difference between the ISAF reintegration guide and the Department of State DDR policy is that ISAF focuses on reconciliation and the Department of State on reintegration and reinsertion. ISAF is focused on larger groups of insurgents, while DDR focuses on the individual and the processes to bring the individual fighter back into the political process. The arguments on either side are that reconciliation identifies and focuses on the center of gravity insurgent group, collapsing it, thus, bringing a large number of insurgents back into the political process. The argument for individual reintegration is the constant sapping of fighter strength causing the collapse of the broader insurgency. The approaches to bringing insurgents back into the political system are different. Since they are different they take different capabilities to execute. However, the also take unity of effort. Unity of effort is critical in ensuring that multiple lines of effort, whether reconciliation or reintegration, are coordinated and mutually supportive. Doctrine is one of the means to ensure this.

This thesis looks at the development and change in doctrine into and how it affects military leadership. Specifically, how military doctrine sets the conditions for a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. If reconciliation and reintegration is part of a

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[36]U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations* (U.S. Department of State, April 2006), 36.

comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, it must be doctrine. However, most would

disagree on the effectiveness of current doctrine in the long term counterinsurgency fight.

General Stanley McCrystal phrased it well stating that people, underpinned by doctrine,

are important.[37] McCrystal's point is that doctrine can guide you, but should not bind the

commander. It should not become so inflexible and so ingrained that it becomes dogma.

A skeptical discussion of current doctrine promotes flexibility necessary for addressing

the differences and evolution of insurgencies. British Colonel Rupert Jones thought that

the doctrine in 2001 was not bad, incorporating enduring principles and it in 2009 had not

changed much.[38] The significant beneficial improvement in Field Manual 3-24 was

making counterinsurgency digestible for military officers and civilian leaders. The FM 3-

24 doctrine may not have told military officers everything, but it contemporized

counterinsurgency for the United States and NATO. As Colonel Jones phrases "Field

Manual 3-24 was like a remake of a much loved film."[39] Another key point was that

doctrine manuals provide useful tools for a military officer's quiver, but the key is to

ensure that no two tools are the same.[40] A senior level Special Forces officer critical of

Field Manual 3-24, counters that the current manual is full of what right does not look

like. His example is that the current counterinsurgency doctrine is too government

centric, while in his experience the counterinsurgency success is from the ground up. He

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[37]AA807, Interview.

[38]Colonel Jones opinions were not different on the lack of change in doctrine than those of General Alderson.

[39]British Colonel Rupert Jones, Chief of Staff Basra OP TELIC 2005, Interview by Major Mike Dinesman, Wellington Barracks, England, 7 October 2010.

[40]Ibid.

mentions his experience in an Afghan village, in which all progress such as building of schools and wells was self generated, which raised the question why the local government should cooperate or negotiate with the central government. The central government does not provide anything of value.[41] Thus, disagreements on the effectiveness of current doctrine are rife.

If the insurgent strategy is evolutionary, the counterinsurgent strategy must be flexible enough to adapt. Flexibility and adaptability in a counterinsurgent strategy takes personal, professional or organizational risk. The way leaders reduce the risk in their counterinsurgency strategy is by critically evaluating principles reflected in doctrine of their particular conflict. Thus, leaders gain better understanding of current and past relationships and develop logical and flexible approaches to the insurgent challenge.

<u>The Importance of Doctrine, Planning, Supporting Reconciliation and Reintegration and the Military Leader</u>

This section will discuss the overall reconciliation and reintegration plan in Afghanistan that is not well integrated or comprehensive. This is striking because of doctrine that is available from USAID, the UN and both British and U.S. that supports reconciliation. The UN and USAID identify challenges such as lack of unity of effort, politics, personality impacts, under resourcing, and organizational structural problems that prevent unity of effort, lack of a comprehensive plan supporting reconciliation and reintegration. Doctrine should have enhanced unity of effort, resourcing and the comprehensiveness of the plan, but clearly in the case of Afghanistan it has not.

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[41]Senior Special Forces Officer, Interview by Major Jesse Stewart, 31 August 2010. Interviews were confidential: The names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

Doctrine is important to the military leader because if provides a point for a leader to start planning and developing courses of action. It also lets the leader look for resources available inside and outside of their organization leading to a more comprehensive plan that is supported by a unity of effort not only by the military, but all external forces and the host nation. Doctrine should not interfere with the conduct of operations. It should, however, inform preparations in terms of methods and equipment.[42] It should principally condition the military leaders mind and must be flexible enough for amendments. Above all, the military commander and senior level civilian leaders must base their strategy on the environment and not simply rely on doctrine.[43] It is to prepare the mind, not simply dictate the plan. For the leader it is a book of ideas. It is vital that district governors and senior civilian leaders have a say as to how the campaign is carried out.[44]

Kitson comments on the flexibility, changing nature and the use of doctrine. Fundamentally, to maintain doctrine flexibility, it must reach out to commanders in the theater of war. The purpose of the commander is to spread the doctrine.[45] Kitson comments on what doctrine should be, implying that it is not there yet. However, the argument could be with the changing nature of conflicts doctrine may never get it right. If we take Kitson's comments that doctrine should frame the commander's mind, then that

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[42]General Sir Frank Kitson, Senior British Commander and COIN Author, Interview by Major Brian McCarthy, Shepton Mallet, England, 4 October 2010.

[43]AA1009, Interview.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid.

doctrinal end state of permanent change is probably acceptable. Furthermore, comprehensive doctrine that is shared by doctrine will better support a comprehensive reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty plan

If a reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty plan is to be comprehensive, then the overall counterinsurgency plan must be comprehensive as well. The challenge per Paul Hughes, USIP, currently is that doctrine is not currently comprehensive. He states that very few current United States governmental organizational cultures function in the way that the military needs them to function. He recommends a civil force of the future. This would be an organization led potentially by the Department of State or a new agency that focuses on capacity building. This civil force is currently the missing counterpart to the military effort. As the military provides security, the civil force develops governmental capacity, rule of law, economics and a political system that reconciles and reintegrates citizens into its process. This force is scalable as necessary for the mission. He further recommends that the United States Congress task a commission to research this civil force of the future to better integrate the long term counterinsurgency plan into the current counterinsurgency doctrine.[46] The advantage is that the military would potentially be better able to set the conditions for final political reconciliation, and local reintegration. Currently the military is focused on security, which is correct, but it may be better able to tailor its security if the military knows what end states are required by subsequent long term civilian efforts such as reconciliation. The military has agreed to interagency training, but Congress must commit resources.[47] Currently the challenge lies

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[46]AA811, Interview.

[47]Ibid.

with the Department of State and Congress.[48] Sarah Lynch, senior strategist for United

States Agency for International Development, echoes USIP. The budgeting process for

United States Agency for International Development is cumbersome involving

Congress.[49] There is little to no long term planning in United States Agency for

International Development or the Department of State for reconciliation. There was some

hope that this situation would change with new leadership.[50]The requirement to act and

improve the situation lies with Congress and the Department of State.[51] But, similar to

any political challenge, even in the United States personalities matter and the Department

of State feels that the Department of Defense is interfering in their duties.[52] The planning

for reconciliation could start earlier, be more comprehensive, better resourced and may

cause the host nation government to implement the strategy earlier, when security

conditions allow.

There are challenges to starting early in the reconciliation and reintegration

planning process. Should a government hold off military action and wait for perfect

intelligence on a reconciliation and reintegration plan? The answer of course is no. The

reality is that decisions are made and plans are formed with some facts and many

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[48]AA811, Interview.

[49]Sarah Ann Lynch, United States Agency for International Development Strategic Planning, Interview by Major Winston Marbella, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 14 September 2010.

[50]Sepideh Keyvanshad, United States Agency for International Development, Interview by author, National War College, Washington, DC, 14 September 2010.

[51]AA811, Interview.

[52]Ibid.

assumptions. Early planning identifies the facts and assumptions. As the conflict

progresses, leaders with an existing plan can confirm or deny pre-existing facts and

assumptions either supporting the current plan or causing the execution of a contingency.

The presence of a comprehensive plan, even if flawed and based on assumptions that in

the end are not true, is more supportive to a unity of effort and maintaining the political

and military will than no plan at all.

In 2009, according to United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) key to successful planning should be cooperation and coordination between

USAID and military organizations. The effects should be to synchronize, but not to

duplicate or overlap efforts resulting in wasted resources. There is friction in developing

a new form of planning. USAID is hesitant to develop long term plans, unlike the

military, because the situation on the ground changes significantly. However, it has long

term projects whereas the military focuses more on projects with immediate short term

returns.[53] A comprehensive reconciliation plan led by the host nation is a time intensive

process. As mentioned earlier, it requires governmental capacity and the maintenance of

the political will. The effects of USAID and Department of State efforts are long term.

The military's efforts are more immediate. The military effort on security is localized and

can be very rapid, but not necessarily long term. The military has the ability to build

political capacity at the local level and tie this progress into the overall long term

reconciliation, reintegration plan. A challenge that undermines comprehensive planning

on most efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is timelines. One of the factors that affect military

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[53]Dr. Mark Moyar, COIN Author, Director of Research for Orbis Operations of the Crumpton Group, Interview by author, Washington, DC, 13 September 2010.

efforts is that unit rotations are typically one year long. At the end of the year, United

States commanders are challenged to show results. The incentive is towards short term

gains at the possible loss of a long term win that may additionally undermine larger host

nation or interagency efforts.[54] The war in Afghanistan has been described as a series of

eight one year wars for the military, instead of one eight year war.[55] The military works

with these challenges. A further challenge lies in the larger internal United States political

system that threatens to undermine the will to continue the counterinsurgency fight and

support the host nation. It is the political and more specifically the funding cycle. It is

difficult to secure funding for a war that is not winning. Thus the impetus is on delivering

results in measurable quantities.[56] The term used currently is bench marks. This opposes

one of the principles of reconciliation and reintegration which advocates that there is no

success or failure. This principle advocates that the process of reconciliation and

reintegration is an evolutionary process that is difficult to measure. In the political

process success and failure are relative with respect to each other. Reconciliation and

reintegration consists of smaller steps. It is the accumulation of these smaller steps both

positive and negative continue to move reconciliation and reintegration in a positive

direction. It is arguable that without a defined and measurable end state this process will

go on forever. There is good argument that it should be a continual process. The process

is not measured in days, weeks or months, but instead, years and decades. The challenge

lies in developing a long term plan that has flexibility in adapting external force

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[54]Keyvanshad, Interview.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Hughes, Interview.

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challenges and to the needs of the local population. The way forward continues to be an inter-agency comprehensive approach to civilian efforts as part of counterinsurgency.

The reason improvements in this inter agency approach is important is because in the view of United States Agency for International Development is that the planning would refine the United States Agency for International Development structure. An improved structure would lead to better capabilities to help implement a comprehensive reconciliation and reintegration plan at the earliest time possible. The structural problems are external with budgeting, but also internal with leadership and decisions. The effect of the current structure is that United States Agency for International Development does not use Afghan resources nearly enough. United States Agency for International Development could play a more significant role in reintegrating Afghans and Iraqis under a host nation leadership. An internal criticism of United States Agency for International Development was that it had 100 United States personnel along with 250 Afghan in their mission. However, there was no deliberate Afghan involvement in the strategic planning process.[57] By and large, the impression is that Afghan's, like the United States, want to contribute. They regionally recruited Afghans to bring cultural intelligence to the planning process. The call to action by some United States Agency for International Development staffers is that more needs to be done to integrate host nation talents and cultural expertise in areas of development and reintegration.[58] Key to the long term success in counterinsurgency is for the host nation government to lead their own development and corresponding reconciliation and reintegration programs. Lynch echoes

[57]AA809, Interview.

[58]Lynch, Interview; Hughes, Interview.

Hughes; a significant hurdle to overcome is that United States Agency for International Development is undereducated for the task assigned and at this time unsure of the funding to bring into the organization experts that can help.[59]

The end state to an insurgency is a long term solution to the conflict. A critical component of that is reconciliation. A British Special Forces Lieutenant termed reconciliation as "essential" to the long term solution.[60] The long term solution is not just the absence of violence, but the presence of a viable encompassing political process.[61]

United Nations Doctrine

The United Nations (UN) approach to reconciliation, reintegration and amnesty is in its Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. The focus of UN doctrine is for reintegration of former insurgents back into the political process. The UN has had some success, but also has experienced significant challenges as it tries to realign its mission, organization and resources to more effectively support insurgencies, where in the case of Afghanistan they have struggled.

Since the 1980s, the United Nations has been tasked to support multiple countries in a peacekeeping context.[62] Some of these countries have been Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia and the Sudan. In a non peacekeeping

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[59]Hughes, Interview.

[60]UK Special Forces Support Group Afghanistan J2 2010, Interview by Major McCarthy, 1 October 2010. Interviews were confidential: The names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

[61]Moyar, Interview.

[62]United Nations, *United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center,* http://unddr.org/iddrs/01/ (accessed 29 October 2010).

context the United Nations has executed its Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration engagement in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Congo,

Indonesia (Aceh), Niger, Somalia, Solomon Islands and Uganda. The level of success has

varied. There are structural challenges within the United Nations that has limited some of

its effectiveness.

> While the United Nations has acquired significant experience in the
> planning and management of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
> programmes, it has yet to establish a collective approach to Disarmament,
> Demobilization and Reintegration, or clear and usable policies and guidelines to
> facilitate coordination and cooperation among United Nations agencies,
> departments and programmes. This has resulted in poor coordination and planning
> and gaps in the implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization and
> Reintegration programmes.[63]

According to the United Nations, the Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration process contributes to security and stability in a post conflict area of

operations so that recovery and development can begin. The United Nations realizes that

it is similar to the reconciliation and reintegration process and involves political, military,

security, humanitarian and socio-economic aspects. The aim is to provide livelihoods to

people that have only been trained to fight, remove weapons, take combatants out of

military structures and aid them in their social and economic reintegration.[64]

The United Nations defines reintegration specifically as "Reintegration is the

process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment

and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open

time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the

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[63]United Nations 2010.

[64]Ibid.

general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance."[65] The United Nations definition is similar to the British definition for reintegration and that of the United States Department of State. "The United Nations uses the concept and abbreviation 'DDR' as an all inclusive term that includes related activities, such as repatriation, rehabilitation and reconciliation, that aim to achieve sustainable reintegration"[66] The focus of the United Nations is on reintegration. The supporting efforts to achieve this aim are reconciliation and amnesty.

The United Nations has realized that the scale and complexity of peacekeeping operations and non-peacekeeping operations has increased. This increase in scale and complexity has required the United Nations to change its organizational approach in order to avoid challenges of the past in which programmes were conducted in a fractured manner, resulting in poor coordination and sometimes competition between and among peacekeeping operations, funds and programmes.[67] Thus, the goal of the United Nations is to support reconciliation and reintegration in an integrated and coordinated manner.

The United Nations provides unique capabilities to peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations. It is positioned to support the integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process. Furthermore it also provides a breadth of scope, neutrality, impartiality and capacity building. Most importantly, the United Nations considers itself an effective and proactive peace broker.[68] In the search for peace

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[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid.

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it is called upon to provide assistance in the planning and building of peace processes

such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. In pursuit of Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration, the United Nations uses six principles as guides. They

are:

1. People-centered and rights based

2. Flexible

3. Transparent and Accountable

4. Nationally Owned

5. Integrated

6. Well planned.[69]

Most notably, the United Nations realizes as critical "that United Nations

departments, agencies and funds recognize their role in supporting national actors in the

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process, including by building national

capacities within government and civil societies."[70]

<u>British Doctrine</u>

Per the British doctrine "[w] is not complete until reconciliation and reintegration

has been achieved. R2inC [Reconciliation and Reintegration in Conflict] therefore

applies across the spectrum of conflict resolution from prevention to post conflict."[71] The

word reconciliation is a relatively new word for what has traditionally been the

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[69]United Nations 2010.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Research Team, *Reintegration and Reconciliation-Theory and Practice 2010*, 1.

"achievement of peace within or between actors."[72] According to John Paul Lederach it contains four critical elements. They are truth, justice, mercy and peace.[73] It is part of stabilization operations but affects all types of stabilization and even combat operations. The British doctrine makes several fundamental points

1. Reconciliation is led by the host nation government

2. Reconciliation can only take place in an environment where the reasons for conflict have dissolved.

3. Reconciliation can only occur if reconciling parties admit that justice has already been done or past wrongs are in the past and parties are willing to negotiate.

4. There is a distinction between reconciliation at the national level and reintegration at operation or tactical level. At the national level there is political aspect to reconciliation, while at the tactical level the reintegration is executed at the local level. Both reconciliation at the national level and reintegration at the tactical level must be closely coordinated in order to produce the desired long term desired effects.

5. At the senior level, leaders must understand political reintegration in order to best guide the host nation. At the tactical level, commanders must execute reintegration in order to assure success.[74]

The British doctrine further outlines eight principles to ensure that Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict is executed successfully:

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[72]Ibid., 7.

[73]Ibid., 9.

[74]Ibid., 1-2.

Principle 1. Reconciliation is a host nation led initiative. It can be supported by external forces and civilian organizations

Principle 2. Leaders must maintain the military and political will

Principle 3. Governments must develop a joint agency plan that is resourced, coordinated and comprehensive

Principle 4. Start the Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict process early through engagement and accommodation.

Principle 5. There is no template for reconciliation and reintegration dialogue. Engagement and accommodation develops and supports reconciliation and reintegration.

Principle 6. The conditions for Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict is in a context of justice, human rights, rule of law, disarmament and a legitimate political process.

Principle 7. Understand the operational environment. Maintain perspective, understand the predominant place of religion and local culture, accept that there is no success or failure, avoid unrealistic timetables and Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict is about influencing minds and changing behavior.

Principle 8. Reconciliation must be acceptable to the host nation not some external force.[75]

British military doctrine believes that Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict is an operation best executed by agencies other than the military. The military more so than ever, in an effort to conduct full spectrum operations, must be able to execute and adhere to the Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict principles. The military must understand

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[75]Ibid., 3.

that this is a closely coordinated interagency multinational effort. Reintegration is a social and economic process with an open timeframe where ex-combatants attain civilian status and gain sustainable careers and income. At the tactical and operational level, it is the assimilation of ex-combatants and their leaders back into society. The reasons for reintegrating may be political, pragmatic, economic, or other reasons. In this effort, the military shapes the overall operating environment. It sets the conditions for successful action, talks and new circumstances that change mindsets and create the conditions for reconciliation. Security is a fundamental condition provided by the military. Without security, reintegration or even the strategic reconciliation cannot take place. The military cannot direct through kinetic action reconciliation. However, in societies that are engaged in armed conflict, it is only the military that can set the conditions for reconciliation.[76] Finally, Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict is complex. It is complex in its cultural, religious and economic aspects. It requires an understanding of not just culture, but also history of the host nation country including previous counterinsurgency reconciliation and reintegration efforts.[77]

<center>Security</center>

The military is critical in providing security in a counterinsurgency environment, especially when the local security forces whether they are local or national police, paramilitary, regular military or special operations forces do not have the capability to provide for population security. Security from the military point of view is viewed as

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[76]Ibid., 14.

[77]Ibid., 2.

<center>40</center>

conventional operations. Conventional operations are the application of maneuver and firepower to achieve the desired effects. This concept of conventional operations, however, has evolved over time. Conventional operations can now also incorporate effects based operations. This takes into account that human interaction, civil projects, infrastructure, economic or legal development can have desired battlefield effects. The argument has been that the Army and Marine Corps were decidedly conventional, relying on maneuver and firepower to achieve their principle effects. That is not correct. Per Colonel Dale Alford in Al May to June 2003 "we were doing COIN in Al Kut."[78] However, he highlights that the Marines were enemy focused and not focused on the population. With the focus on the enemy both tactical and operational mistakes were made. He highlights the view at the time that "we came on ships and we left on ships."[79] There was no long term view on security, nor was the security tied into a larger strategic plan.

Colonel Alford provides critical insight on how to provide security in a counterinsurgency environment, while trying to build local capacity for security. The key to better security is effective partnering. If the advisor and partnered unit do not eat and live in the same location, then the unit is not effectively partnered. Colonel Alford's assessment in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009 was that U.S. units had in most cases not effectively partnered with their host nation units. He provides the example that Marines built bunkers for Marines and bunkers for Iraqis. Colonel Alford moved Marines and Iraqis in together. There were no patrols without Iraqis. He placed the combat

[78]Alford, Interview.

[79]Ibid.

outposts into the middle of cities, literally as you walked around protective Hercules Engineering Solutions Consortium (HESCOE) barriers; you were in the middle of a market.[80] The benefits of effective partnering are that professionalism and training increases rapidly. Moreover, units that effectively partnered were less susceptible to corruption. Partnered units also fought more effectively, knowing they were supported. These factors contributed to building legitimacy of not only the local host nation security forces, but also the host nation government.[81]

Colonel Alford acknowledges that security, security capacity building and infrastructure are linked and that there was no effective reconciliation and reintegration program in Afghanistan in 2009.[82] The view of some military leaders has been that infrastructure improvements and capacity building have become the predominant focus after security in Afghanistan and it should be reconciliation and reintegration.[83.]

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[80]HESCO Barriers Blast Wall is extensively used in the protection of personnel and key assets in military, peacekeeping, humanitarian and civilian operations.

[81]Alford, Interview.

[82]The focus and amounts of money allocated to infrastructure improvements have caused large amounts of corruption and led to a decrease in the overall security environment as tribal and criminal groups compete for money. The recommendation from military leaders has been focus on security capacity building, existing security, and reducing money allocated to infrastructure improvement. Refocus infrastructure improvement on only those items necessary for population sustainment such as wells, irrigation and small medical facilities. The desire is that the local population through the development of their own economy will decide what larger infrastructure is needed. Finally, in a secure environment, reconcile factions and reintegrate former insurgents, ensuring that this effort is initially resourced financially and legally to succeed.

[83]This opinion was voiced by both Colonel Alford and a Senior Special Forces officer serving in Afghanistan.

There are problems if the military remains focused simply on providing security and does not move towards reconciliation. The fundamental problem is cost. The current levels of deployment of the U.S. Army are simply not sustainable, and the Army is too expensive.[84] The question becomes, how do you reduce the cost of fighting insurgencies? An idea raised is that the Army should have a variety of organizational models tailored to address different insurgencies. If insurgencies are similar and progress through similar phases, perhaps force packages are tailored to meet the need.[85] In addition, the idea is also to make the response to an insurgency scalable, similar to the British experience in Dhofar. The scalability would be from a counterinsurgency response in excess of 150,000 Soldier to a counterinsurgency similar to Oman with less than 5,000 Soldiers. It is clear that the Dhofar was clearly a different type of insurgency and the drivers of the insurgency different that current efforts in Afghanistan. However, there are lessons learned that are valuable and will be discussed later.

<center>Reconciliation is a host nation led initiative</center>

In order for the population to view reconciliation as legitimate, the population must perceive reconciliation as a local initiative. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, reconciliation cannot have the U.S. thumbprint on it. Culturally and politically, the perception of U.S. ownership of the reconciliation effort can jeopardize the future effort.[86] In the example of Basra, Iraq in 2005, reconciliation initiated outside of the host

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[84]Hughes, Interview.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid.

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nation government was not successful.[87] At the same time, drawing lessons from Malaya, unity of effort between the host nation and the external forces supports reconciliation and reintegration. Lacking cooperation reduces the chances of reconciliation and reintegration success. Key to successful cooperation is the host nation and external forces working out desired goals and end states before planning a reconciliation and reintegration effort.[88] The principles for a host nation, with external force support, to seize the initiative in reconciliation are:

1. External forces understanding their aims and understanding the culture of the host nation

2. Understanding that in the end reconciliation and reintegration is fundamental to the long term resolution of an insurgency

3. Setting the conditions early strategically for reconciliation and reintegration to occur

If there is no strategic understanding between host nation and external forces, or the tactical and operational objectives are not in line with strategic reconciliation, the military effort will stall out, casualties will continue to rise and result in considerable counterinsurgency resource waste.[89]

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[87]AA1007, Interview.

[88]Senior Retired Commander British Forces, Interview by Major Jan Gleiman, England, 24 August 2010. Interviews were confidential: The names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

[89]Ibid.

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It is vital that external forces do not impose a U.S. model on the reconciliation and reintegration process. The key effort is to work within host nations cultural norms.[90]

There are numerous examples at the operational level and below that senior leader challenges did not affect the ability of subordinate military leaders from working effectively with their civilian counterpart. A good working relationship was largely personality driven.[91] Key to a good relationship was a mutual understanding of the current situation in addition to an agreement of the desired end state in a specific area of operations. Finally, close coordination at the senior level between civilian and military effort was essential. Fundamentally, both civilian and military effort must mutually support one another.[92] Military provided security is enhanced by development, but civilian development cannot move forward without security. Thus, the civilian and military leadership finds itself in a symbiotic relationship. The failure of one, risks the failure of all. These imperatives are effective leadership skills at the senior levels to avoid stratification of organizations, promote cross communication to reduce redundant efforts and organizational stress and friction. As the organization becomes more efficient, it has the potential to become smaller. A smaller organization becomes more agile and it becomes easier to maintain unity of effort.

The uncontested primacy of U.S forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan is over. The challenge for external forces to maintain their own unity of effort along with that of the

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[90]AA307, Interview.

[91]Keyvanshad, Interview.

[92]United States Army Major Adam Barstow, Aide to the Major General Scapriotti, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force 82-Afghanistan, Interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 September 2010.

host nation becomes more complex. Outside political pressure on an external force to end the conflict, anxious to show progress, frustrated with slow host nation political movement can lead uncoordinated actions, which undermine the perception of the host nation as the reconciliation lead. An example of how the international external forces can undermine the host nation effort is with disenfranchisement. Uncoordinated efforts by external forces negotiate with some tribes while other tribes are left out. This is viewed as unfair and increases the violence. This is currently especially relevant in Helmand province as tribes fight to gain influence in the new government.[93] As politics impact the planning and implementation of reconciliation and reintegration, governments must maintain the military will and not allow personality differences to drive strategy

Maintaining unity of effort within external forces is difficult. Colonel Alford states that in order to maintain unity of effort it is vital that personality and emotions cannot drive negotiations. If it is difficult to maintain unity of effort within an organization that shares cultural values, it becomes more difficult with one that does not share cultural values. This calls for an understanding of existing cultural norms and evaluating structures and organizations to ensure they do not add to disunity. It is important to understand the capabilities and limitations of external forces such as allied NATO nations or the host nation government. It is important to understand that some NATO nation forces are not conducting missions that they are designed to do, so their failure is not due to lack of commitment, but rather lack of resources. There are currently NATO units in battle spaces not organized, equipped or trained to perform their mission.

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[93]United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Miller Ph.D., National Security Council Director for Iraq, Interviewed by author, White House, Washington, DC, 14 September 2010.

The U.S. should strive to place NATO units best in line with their capabilities. Currently, the U.S. does not do that effectively. General McKiernan struggled with this issue and expressed concern that it is only slowly improving.[94]

It is challenging to have the host nation take the lead in the reconciliation and reintegration effort. There are numerous factors on the strategic to the tactical and also the personal that affect the planning and execution of a reconciliation program. In summary, external forces must develop organizations, processes and leadership to support their own unity of effort in supporting the host nation government. At the same time, external forces must maintain the political and military will to support the host nation reconciliation effort, even if that effort is moving too slow for external forces political leadership.

<center>Political and Military Will</center>

Maintenance of political and military will is critical for both the host nation and external forces supporting the counterinsurgency effort. Several factors affect political will. They are the election and fiscal cycle for those states that comprise NATO in Afghanistan, in addition to political maneuvers inside external governments as election cycles near or on part of governmental organizations, to include the military, as fiscal appropriation cycles run their course.

Kitson highlights significant negative impacts on a counterinsurgency effort, if the insurgent perceives a lack of political will. It not only emboldens the insurgent, but also pushes those that have hedged their fortunes with the insurgents to move closer to

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[94]Alford, Interview.

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the insurgents in preparation for an eventual government defeat. That fear or perception of imminent change can have significant negative impacts on security. Kitson reflects on his experience in Aden, when British forces announced when they would leave which raised the perception that the British would lose.[95] Faltering political will has direct negative impacts on security and thus retards efforts towards reconciliation and reintegration. The same is true in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Corruption is a factor that affects both political and military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Money that is driving security and development is also funding corruption.[96] In Afghanistan, the country is plagued by money.[97] The money is a cause in the rising violence in Afghanistan as some tribes wrestle over projects and influence. Al Qaeda and criminality influence the distribution of money throughout Afghanistan.[98] The corruption undermines the legitimacy of both the local and national government. This risks the loss of the external force political will, which will affect the military will. Economic interest groups prevent consensus in the Iraqi and Afghan governments.[99] Lacking consensus slows or prevents the development of political will to reconcile and reintegrate. The economic effect on lacking consensus building is most apparent when the economic playing field is winning and lose and the gain of one tribe or political party is the economic loss of another. Corruption makes it unclear in the legitimate national

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[95]AA1009, Interview.

[96]Miller, Interview; Alford, Interview.

[97]Miller, Interview.

[98]Alford, Interview.

[99]Keyvanshad, Interview.

consensus process to identify the interested parties and negotiate compromise. Therefore, corruption is a significant threat to not only legitimacy, but also consensus building and the maintenance of a host nation political will to reconcile and reintegrate.

<div align="center">

Governments develop joint agency plans that is resourced,
coordinated and comprehensive
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Development of a host nation led joint agency, international resourced, coordinated and comprehensive plan is critical to the implementation of reconciliation and reintegration. The reconciliation and reintegration plan requires high level domestic and political leadership, commitment and resources. It is a plan backed by a communications strategy. The reconciliation and reintegration plan is inclusive of international forces, but also all domestic groups. Planning and developing a joint agency plan is critical. From the military point of view, the U.S. civilian agencies struggle in this area.[100]

Developing a well resourced plan is not without risks. As Kitson cautions to develop a balanced in which insurgent enticements is not excessive, potentially driving recruiting for the insurgency. He also cautions in two legal areas. First, the host nation should not include judicial commitments, presumably in order to preserve the legitimacy of the legal system. Second, it is important to not forget amnesty for those that have fought on the side of the host nation in the resourcing plan as they are sometimes forgotten.[101]

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[100]United States Army Captain Raymond Windmiller, Company Commander D/4-21, Interview by Major Mike Dinesman, Fort Drum, New York, 18 September 2010.

[101]AA1009, Interview.

As the host nation government and its external supporting forces develop a flexible and comprehensive resourcing plan. While developing the flexible resourcing plan, it is important to incorporate the needs of the local level tribes, which are not always predictable.[102] As part of a comprehensive plan, the reconciliation and reintegration plan must be consistent. In Western Afghanistan 2009, lacking consistency was an issue. Local leaders would present insurgent fighter for amnesty and reintegration, only experience arbitrary rejection.[103] Flexibility, comprehensiveness and consistency support continuity of the reconciliation and reintegration process as it continues to draw fighters from the insurgency.

Consistency is a valuable lesson learned previously as will be discussed in the Vietnam case study, the Chieu Hoi process to reconcile or reintegrate back with the government was a calculated process. The more variables in the process the more uncertainty the less likely a successful reconciliation or reintegration. Another component of resourcing the program is enforcement.

A component of consistency is enforcement. The plan should have an enforcement method in order to maintain consistency. Poor enforcement resulted in an early ineffective 2007 Afghan amnesty. Poor enforcement, among other reasons, permitted frequent insurgent switching, sometimes on a daily basis.[104]

The challenge in Afghanistan and Iraq is that current reconciliation and reintegration is neither resourced, comprehensive nor consistent. The lack of these

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[102]AA1006, Interview.

[103]AA1012, Interview.

[104]AA307, Interview.

characteristics in a host nation led plan jeopardize the strategy and risks a back slide into

an insurgency as groups or individuals make the decision to continue the struggle.[105]

<u>Start the Reconciliation, Reintegration in Conflict process early</u>

Understanding the human terrain before deciding to support a counterinsurgency

effort is important. Understanding the human terrain is difficult. The best

recommendation is a continuous review of the human terrain understanding motivations

and linkages. Maintaining flexibility in analyzing human terrain and accepting changes

and significant operational uncertainty is expected. It is advantageous for host nation to

develop reconciliation, reintegration plans early, before the start of an insurgency. The

British Army, based on their Northern Ireland experience at the company grade level

understands now, but may not have appreciated previously that reconciliation is

fundamental and that it is also important to include former insurgents into early

process.[106] Starting the engagement in the reconciliation process early also helps in

understanding the human terrain, identifying and understanding key players and tribes

and their relationship to one another.[107]

At the tactical and operational level, lack of adequate resourcing often prevents

the development of good planning which curbs the early start to engagement and

accommodation. A 2003 resource constraint was shortages of intelligence analysts early

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[105]United States Navy Commander Jeffrey Eggers, Afghanistan General's Strategic Advisory Group Member, Interview by author, White House, Washington, DC, 14 September 2010.

[106]AA1003, Interview.

[107]U.S. Afghanistan Commander, Interview, 1 October 2010. Interview was confidential: The name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement.

in the counterinsurgency process. In addition lacking resources resulted in frustrated information sharing system that stove piped information. Lacking information impaired early attempts to engage insurgent and tribal leaders leading to missed opportunities and mistakes. The lack of intelligence, by not developing a reconciliation plan early, makes the initial steps of planning, engagement and accommodation frustrating and difficult.[108]

Early planning enhances the effectiveness of security propaganda and conventional targeting. A challenge to engagement is getting the insurgent to engage in negotiations. This is especially true if the insurgent perceives to be winning. Early planning facilitates rapid sharing of the information environment reducing the insurgents' perception of winning, maintaining effective pressure through conventional targeting and denying the insurgent a safe haven through rapid and effective establishment of security. In the absence of a capable host nation security force, the external military can provide consistent pressure kinetically on insurgents.[109]

With early planning, forces can ensure that at the same time that there is kinetic pressure, there is pressures through economic and cultural isolation as insurgents are cut off from their means of sustainment, families, clans, tribes and culture. The combined effects of host nation leadership, early planning, security, political and military will and unity of effort undermine the insurgent's perception in the viability of their struggle causing them to reconcile and reintegrate with the host nation government.

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[108]AA1003, Interview.

[109]Senior Special Forces Commander, Interview by Major Jesse Stewart, Fort Carson, Colorado, 24 August 2010. Interviews were confidential: The names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

Doctrine is key to the military leader in developing their plan. Doctrine is based on principles. Doctrine cannot remain static, but must always be challenged to remain valid. The principles in doctrine should be flexible enough to allow leaders to develop creative plans adapted to their circumstances. It is useful to take principles as themes in order to determine if these principles are still relevant and effective to counter insurgencies.

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis will look at historical case studies in terms of the following themes:

1. Host nation and external forces must set security conditions conducive to enabling reconciliation and reintegration

2. Security forces must through security operations continue to maintain the pressure on insurgents to reconcile and reintegrate

3. Host nations must lead in the reconciliation and reintegration effort

4. The host nation and external forces must maintain unity of effort in order to see reconciliation and reintegration succeed

5. The host nation and external forces must maintain the political will to start and continue to reconcile and reintegrate

6. Start the reconciliation process and planning for reintegration early.

In order to better understand these principles as a lens to looking at reconciliation and reintegration in insurgencies, it is important to discuss these concepts in more detail.

CHAPTER 4

VIETNAM

Case Study Vietnam 1963-1974

Vietnam was a unique campaign due to the fact there was an insurgency led by

the Viet Cong and had a large dangerous conventional threat, the North Vietnamese

Army.[110] The Vietnam War ended with the conventional defeat of the Republic of

Vietnam. (South Vietnam) Overall, there was less reconciliation with the targeted groups

on a national scale. Instead, the process was local with small groups or individuals taking

advantage of the reintegration program available in South Vietnam. The effect was the

defection of insurgent fighters, contributing to the Viet Cong collapse in 1969. The case

study provides lessons on providing security as a condition for reintegration. In addition,

conventional operations, as part of security, applied pressure to reintegrate. The case

study highlights the success of reintegration with Chieu Hoi.[111]

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[110]Sources that would contribute to the conclusion that this war was other than black and white, totally conventional or totally counterinsurgency are: W. Scott Thompson, and Frizzell Donaldson, *The Lessons of Vietnam*; Richard Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*; Robert Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*; Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam,* Andrade, Dale. "Westmoreland was right: Learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 2 (June 2008); J. M. Carrier and Alexander Charles Holmes Thompson, "Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi"; Lawrence E. Grinter, "Amnesty in South Vietnam An Analysis of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program in the Republic of Vietnam,"(Field Research, Advanced Research Projects Agency).

[111]Lawrence E. Grinter, "Amnesty in South Vietnam An Analysis of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program in the Republic of Vietnam" (Field Research, Advanced Research Projects Agency, August 1967).

The main arguments over the conduct of the Vietnam War by the United States are that the war was conducted too conventionally and the leadership was flawed and ignoring the lessons from previous insurgencies. The central point is that resources were committed to a conventional war that would have been better to apply to a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, similar to that used in Malaya. The arguments ignore that although Malaya counterinsurgency principles do apply, Vietnam had the added twist of a conventional threat.

With the deployment of Army formations to Vietnam in 1965 and the gradual build up of forces, the United States escalated conventional operations in South Vietnam. The response was appropriate to that threat. Krepinevich attributes the lack of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to the personal leadership failure of General William Westmoreland.[112] In his view, Westmoreland simply chose to ignore previous counterinsurgency lessons and believed that the enemy could be defeated by conventional means.[113] The truth is grey. Westmoreland perceived a credible conventional threat that threatened to destroy small units engaged in pacification in detail. The counter to this threat was larger formations with the firepower to counter this threat. Thus, the strategy in Vietnam evolved, much like the enemies strategy evolved. Authors such as Dale Andrade and Andrew Krepinevich decidedly disagree on Westmoreland's capability to execute a sound counterinsurgency strategy.[114] Andrade argues that enemy initiative

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[112]Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 165-166.

[113]Krepinevich, 167.

[114]Andrade argues that there were two types of thinkers about Vietnam. There were either those who believe that Hanoi was the center of gravity and destroying North

determined the outcome of the insurgency.[115] Both authors agree, the United States effort

was a purely defensive strategy incapable of achieving victory.[116]

Krepinevich argues the initial Vietnam War strategy was based on conventional

combat operations ignoring lessons learned from Malaya, and that was a cause for the

failure of the counterinsurgency and eventual defeat in Vietnam.[117] The argument ignores

that reintegration was a success between 1969 and 1973.

The insurgency in Malaya was a studied by some within the United States

military, while engaged in Vietnam. The lessons drawn out of the Malayan insurgency

were pacification programs and the role of security operations. Kitson stated the British

view that force was only a means to support decisive combined political, economic and

propaganda effort.[118] It is tough to argue that Westmoreland simply ignored lessons

taught at military schools or the calls of his junior officers for a more counterinsurgency

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Vietnam would end the insurgency in South Vietnam. Then there are those that believe
that the insurgent in South Vietnam was the center of gravity and should be the focus of
pacification effort. Andrade argues that Krepinevich places Westmoreland in the group of
thinkers that thought the center of gravity was in North Vietnam. Andrade argues that
Westmoreland countered the main conventional forces and failed to prevent the guerilla
offensive in 1968. Abrams on the other hand focused on pacification and did not prevent
the conventional build up in 1972. Andrade argues that the answer is grey and a function
of both. The counterinsurgency simply did not have the numbers to engage in both
conventional and counterinsurgency operations at the same time. Thus with failed support
from Washington, the effort was simply defensive and the delay of the inevitable defeat.

[115]Dale Andrade, "Westmoreland was right: Learning the wrong lessons from the
Vietnam War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 174.

[116]Ibid., 158

[117]Krepinevich, 164-167.

[118]John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons
from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 205.

focused approach similar to Malaya. The answer is greyer. Westmoreland acknowledged the value of pacification, but also realized the decisive capability of the enemy to destroy his force. He did not have the capability to both mass conventional forces and engage in counterinsurgency efforts.

The U.S. found itself in am position that it must maintain a conventional capability to a building northern Vietnamese conventional threat, but shape the conventional force in a way to achieve counter insurgency objectives. Krepinevich argues that conventional combat operations alone will not split the population from the insurgent.[119] He was correct; applied to Vietnam, it was security operations in conjunction with a nationally led reintegration program that proved successful.[120]

In light of the significant conventional threat to South Vietnamese and U.S. forces, General Westmoreland's strategies for winning the war in Vietnam were to:

1. Bolster the South Vietnamese government and Army and avoid conventional defeat

2. Escalate pressure against North Vietnam

3. Execute a base security strategy

4. Execute an enclave strategy

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[119]Krepinevich, 240-248.

[120]The U.S. lost the war in Vietnam. The argument is that at the operational level, security operations and reintegration were successful. This highlights that a nation can be successful at the tactical and operational level, but if the strategy is flawed, the overall war is lost. However, even though a war is lost, there are valuable operational and tactical lessons. There are significant lessons from failure. Nagl argues that the U.S. learned the wrong lessons from Vietnam by becoming more conventionally oriented illustrated with Desert Storm and the militaries poor performance in Somalia and later Iraq and Afghanistan.

5. Initiate a gradual buildup of forces for the purpose of putting pressure on communist structure and forces

6. Maximize expansion of Vietnamese armed forces thereby increasing efforts to pacify all of South Vietnam[121]

General Westmoreland resourced the most dangerous conventional threat first, which in hindsight was a valid assessment. After containing the most dangerous threat, he focused on the most likely threat, Viet Cong operations.[122] The reason this observation is useful is because military leaders argue for more reconciliation and reintegration efforts. However, the need for reconciliation and reintegration must be balanced against a real conventional threat. Military leaders must guard against the real threat of the destruction of their force first. Once this is achieved, the military can support offensive reconciliation and reintegration. Ideally, the military force should be robust enough to do both simultaneously, but that level of mass is difficult to achieve.

Westmoreland's relief in 1968 by General Abrams changed the nature of the Vietnam War from a conventional to a more comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. This does not ignore the fact that Westmoreland did have counterinsurgency components in his strategy such as his support of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Program (CORDS). However, Krepinevich gives credit to Abrams for introducing the non-conventional strategy.[123] Andrade argues that the focus did not

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[121]W. Scott Thompson and Frizzell Donaldson, *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977), 57-69.

[122]Ibid., 58.

[123]Krepinevich, 253.

entirely shift. Operations in Vietnam were still predominantly conventional.[124] The lesson

learned is that conventional operations in a comprehensive counterinsurgency are not an

either/or choice. A flexible doctrine and subsequent strategy allow the commander the

choice of action across the spectrum of force. Military force is an essential component to

setting the security conditions necessary for counterinsurgency initiatives. This is true in

Vietnam where the United States needed a full range of force capabilities supporting

counterinsurgency efforts in South Vietnam as well as the North Vietnamese

conventional threat.[125]

CORDS was initiated in 1967 at the end of General Westmoreland's command

and in an atmosphere of failing U.S. political will. Historian Richard Hunt describes the

means, during the Vietnam conflict, of winning the "hearts and minds" of the population

and undermining the popular support for the insurgent and guerilla fighter.[126] Richard

Hunt in *Pacification: the American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* outlines the

creation of CORDS.[127] CORDS was a unique civil/military agency with the goal to

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[124]Andrade, 174-175.

[125]The maintenance of political will is crucial to military success. General Abrams efforts to broaden the counterinsurgency strategy were too late because the political will of the United States started to fail significantly after the 1968 Tet Offensive. The tide of popular support had changed the political mood of the United States and time expired to execute the counterinsurgency strategy. (Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict 1986.)

[126]Richard Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 84-85.

[127]Earlier it was discussed that draconian Hearts and Minds measures may undermine the political will of the external force. In the case of Vietnam, population control measures similar to Malaya would have been politically unsupportable in the U.S. The media and public opinion had a much greater impact on the war than it did in Malaya.

coordinate all United States programs supporting the counterinsurgency efforts in South

Vietnam. It promoted unity of effort, but also made it possible for host nation efforts such

as the Chieu Hoi to be reinforced.[128] It was a program in pursuit of a pacification strategy

and developed and led, but under-resourced by General Westmoreland.[129] The initial

impetus for the program came from President Johnson.[130] Until President Johnson made

it a priority, pacification did not receive the resources or focus. Accordingly, the South

Vietnamese viewed CORDS and its programs as subordinate to the conventional war

priorities.[131]

Chieu Hoi

The Chieu Hoi Program was a South Vietnamese government reintegration

program. Although the initiation of the program was challenging, it was credited as a

major factor leading to the attrition of the Viet Cong in 1969 South Vietnam. Chieu Hoi

was certainly not the only factor. Conventional targeting of Viet Cong and the losses they

suffered attacking major cities and U.S. basis during the Tet offensives of 1968

contributed significantly. Strategically, the program relied on factors such as a continued

targeting, secure environment, host nation program ownership, unity of effort and host

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[128]Koch, vi.

[129]Hunt, 86-89.

[130]Ibid., 86-93.

[131]Andrade, 160.

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nation political will. On the operational and tactical side, it is important to note the importance of propaganda in ensuring success in the reintegration program.[132]

The Chieu Hoi program started with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in 1963. Chieu Hoi was a South Vietnamese program to encourage defections by the Viet Cong and their supporters. It drew its inspiration from historical precedent. The United States experience which shaped Chieu Hoi was gained through Rufus Phillips and C.R. Bohannan and their experience with EDCOR (Economic Development Corps) in the Philippines.[133] President Ramon Magsaysay offered successful amnesty and resettlement to the Hukbalahaps in 1954.[134] Another experience that was crucial to the development of the Chieu Hoi was the advise Sir Robert Thompson, who was with the British Advisor Mission in Vietnam. He successfully convinced the highest levels of the Vietnamese government to initiate this reintegration program.[135]

President Diem placed some of his best administrators in charge of the program. In the first three months, it met with success with up to 5,000 enemies defecting. Even after President Diem's death in 1964 an additional 10,000 enemies defected. The United

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[132]Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), 9-14.

[133]Grinter, vii-ix.

[134]The administration of Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957) successfully used strategies such as amnesty, economic and land reform to address insurgent grievances. He also resettled a large portion of the Catholic population into traditionally Muslim areas. This relieved population pressures in the North of the country, but would set the stage for future hostilities in the south. The lesson learned was that targeted amnesty and reconciliation is essential to establishing security. (Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990).

[135]Koch, v-vi.

States advisors noted the success of the program and urged greater focus in support of it. However, a year and a half after its initiation, it was largely underfunded, lacking trained personnel, and plagued by internal weaknesses.[136]

However, senior United States leaders saw a favorable cost and benefit ratio, considering it potentially the best in Vietnam to reduce the number of insurgents on the battlefield. The cost of processing, retraining, and resettling a defector was $250, less than the cost of an enemy killed in action or captured.[137] Because of its cost effectiveness and the expense of conventional operations, United States leaders decided to resource the program with more qualified personnel.[138] In 1967 the Chieu Hoi program grew into a full ministry and became the executive responsibility of the CORDS. USAID provided financial, logistic and personnel support while the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was responsible for the development and dissemination of psychological operations in support of Chieu Hoi.[139]

In April 1967, GVN implemented a new policy of "national reconciliation" ("Dai Doan Ket"). The policy promised that the Hoi Chan, or defectors, would receive amnesty and guarantees of political and civilian rights.[140] In addition, the GVN provided guarantees to help Hoi Chan start careers commensurate to experience, loyalty and

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[136]Grinter, 135.

[137]Koch, vii.

[138]Ibid., vi.

[139]Grinter, 3-4.

[140]Ho Van Cham, "The Chieu Hoi Program in Vietnam" (Saigon, RVN: The Vietnam Council on Foreign Relations circa, 1973), 4-7.

ability.[141] However, Dai Doan Ket, lacked unity of national effort and was never broadly implemented due to the fact that the program was perceived as a United States program. In addition, GVN administrators were slow to reward their enemies with political careers, and even less enthused to offer enemies political participation in a Coalition government.[142]

Primary source information such as "Amnesty in South Vietnam 1967" outline the Chieu Hoi program in detail as the means induce defections, motives for defection, reception and interrogation, indoctrination, vocational training, employment and resettlement.[143] Eric Bergerud in *The Dynamics of defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* would characterize the Chieu Hoi program after 1968, especially under the accelerated pacification program, as a success.[144]

The deteriorating security situation for the South Vietnamese as a result of the 1968 Offensive reduced the Chieu Hoi momentum. After Tet, the combined effect of security operations and defections had significantly degraded the Viet Cong. A significant contributing cause to the Viet Cong collapse was the Armed Propaganda Teams.[145]

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[141]Koch, vii.

[142]Ibid., viii.

[143]Grinter.

[144]Bergerud, 225, the definition of success is that reintegration is reducing insurgents at a greater rate than they are generated. In addition, the reintegration and reconciliation programs are effectively undermining potential insurgent recruiting with a the result of reduced insurgent effectiveness.

[145]Koch, vii; Cham, 4-5, 9.

The Armed Propaganda teams conducted face to face contact with villagers and fighters. The members of the Armed Propaganda teams were special defectors who had volunteered to conduct direct contact psychological warfare work. These Hoi Chanh were usually locally trained and rudimentarily armed. They operated in small teams of thirty six men per camp and probed the Viet Cong infrastructure and family groups. Their operations were proof to the Viet Cong that they had not been mistreated by the South Vietnamese. Mistreatment had been a significant hurdle preventing defection.[146]

The Chieu Hoi program peaked over the course of the year in 1969 with 47,023 Viet Cong defecting. However, not many officers or high ranking officials defected. The GVN expanded its presence into former contested areas, while also increasing security of controlled areas. This in conjunction with the improvements in economic development started to reach down to village level with significant positive counterinsurgency effects.[147]

After 1970, the Chieu Hoi rally rate started to decline. This was partially due to declining support by GVN leaders to make it a national reconciliation program. Another reason was that there simply were not that many Viet Cong. Chieu Hoi shifted from local reintegration with national support to a national program with inducements focused on high ranking military and political VC/NVA cadres. In addition, the new program placed greater emphasis on improved political rehabilitation and vocational training.[148]

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[146]Grinter, 17-19.

[147]Koch, vii; Cham, 9-14.

[148]Cham, 4-15.

The Chieu Hoi rates in 1971 fluctuated, but continued to decline because of political instability surrounding South Vietnamese presidential elections. The United States advisory effort was phased down, but financial support remained at 1970 levels. The GVN planned for a complete takeover of the Chieu Hoi Program in 1972.[149]

There are key tactical and operational lessons to learn from the Chieu Hoi. The reception of the defector was critical. The government had to keep promises and commitments communicated by psychological operations. If the government did not keep its promises, insurgent trust would fail. Insurgent confidence and belief that they would be treated well was critical to the decision to defect. Resourcing, initially, was inadequate. A shortage of adequately trained and motivated South Vietnamese personnel plagued the program. The shortage of trained and motivated personnel was later addressed by hiring defectors into the reception teams. The skills training that Chieu Hoi received were not adequate for successful reintegration and the result was a lack of skilled trainers that resulted in training focused solely on simpler skills. These simpler skills involved manual skills, not always suited for the career desire of the defector. Career skills identified as desirable were masonry, carpentry, tailoring, barbering and hollow-block making in addition to other advanced vocational skills.[150] Hiring the Chieu Hoi into military and paramilitary programs such as the Army of Vietnam (ARVN), Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF), Armed Propaganda Teams, and Kit Carson

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[149]Koch, viii.

[150]Ibid., 150.

Scouts was effective. In addition, using Chieu Hoi in psychological operations and interrogations also proved remarkably successful.[151]

One continuing challenge was the resettlement of the Chieu Hoi that did not join government agencies. Again, the problem was lack of trained and motivate GVN administrators to encourage families to move. The result of these resettlements was that the protection of the extended family base in the traditional hamlet was reduced. The hamlets became vulnerable to VC reprisals, isolating Hoi Chan families from mainstream Vietnamese life.[152]

Leon Goure identified the reasons why some Viet Cong and their supporting civilian infrastructure defected. His Rand study, "Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors" the reasons were:

1. The timing of the decision to defect

2. Factors that inhibit or delay defections

3. Channels by which Chieu Hoi propaganda reaches defectors

4. Motives for defection

5. Influence exercised by VC families that move to GVN controlled areas[153]

Goure notes that the defectors were described by the VC as poor farmers and fishermen, and that this was a social class favored by the VC and considered to be the

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[151]Cham, 4-17; Koch, 107-110.

[152]Koch, viii-ix.

[153]Goure, ix.

backbone of the communist movement.[154] He makes two observations. First, reintegration in Chieu Hoi was a bottom-up approach with the focus on a predominance of lower level fighters. A reason that there were more low level fighters that rallied was that in 1965 large numbers of poorly motivated draftees entered the Viet Cong Forces. Another reason was the growing dissatisfaction of the rural population with the Viet Cong Policies.[155] Second, identifying the class enabled more focused analysis of the five factors that encourage Viet Cong to defect.[156]

Vietnam is noteworthy, although not the first, in the effect that propaganda had on the reintegration process.[157] J. M. Carrier in "*Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi*" argues that successful government propaganda should aim to provide specific information on how to rally, to whom, and when. The GVN should reduce the potential ralliers' fears to themselves or families and finally reassure them about the future. The GVN should design leaflets as surrender passes and accept them as

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[154]Leon Goure, "Inducements and Deterrents to Defections: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors" (Rand Corporation, 1968), 10.

[155]Carrier and Holmes Thompson, 28.

[156]This is a similarity to the principle fighters that comprise both the bulk of both low level Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives. Thus, it translates that, with caution to cultural factors, understanding the five reasons to defect above is effective in other insurgencies.

[157]The use of targeted propaganda to undermine the will of insurgents isn't new. There are examples of its use from WWI, to Malaya and Dhofar. The instructive part was the focus on instructing the Viet Cong how to best start to reintegrate themselves, since this lacking information was identified as critical to getting Viet Cong to Chieu Hoi.

temporary identity cards. Furthermore, he suggests that the government leave political arguments out of the propaganda campaign.[158]

The process to defect is complex. Personal factors not ideology motivate defection.[159] There are four stages of defection and these are; loyal VC member, potential defector, active seeker of ways to defect, and successful defector.[160] It is clear that the decision to defect is usually never an impulse decision. Goure states that "[e]ven the VC member who has come to a definite decision [to defect] usually waits for an opportunity to evade VC surveillance and to surrender safely to GVN."[161]

The results of the Rand study have some applicability even today. Motives to defect in order of priority were, personal hardship, fear of being killed, economic family hardship, criticism and punishment, denial of home leave, lack of career potential by VC, dissatisfaction with VC policies, loss of faith in VC victory, removal of family to GVN controlled area, arrest or execution of family member by the VC, forcible recruitment into the VC, and dislike of VC taxes.[162]

Goure notes that fear of being killed by allied attacks increased defections.[163] This supports arguments for security operations as an equal part to civilian affairs and government and economic capacity building. It also justifies continued military shaping

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[158]Carrier and Holmes Thompson, xv-xvi.

[159]Ibid., xi.

[160]Goure, 15.

[161]Ibid.

[162]Ibid., xi.

[163]Ibid., 13.

operations that set conditions favorable for enemies to defect. This may seem to contradict the British Malay experience in which military operations support propaganda, civil and political initiatives. The choice is not that a counterinsurgency uses all military capabilities or none at all. Instead, it is more a graduated military response to a situation. There are points in an insurgency that the military must be violent. There are other times that the military simply must threaten the capacity to inflict violence. The call is for a military that is flexible in its means to respond.

Goure identifies the following factors as critical. The fear of GVN mistreatment or arrest on the way to surrender was a major deterrent to defection. The factor of trust was significant. The Chieu Hoi appeals increased the defections process. However, lack of trust was still an issue.[164] A surprisingly large factor in defection was the removal of VC families to GVN controlled areas. The interviews also showed that economic factors were critical, and Goure identifies this as a possible opportunity for future exploitation not only in Vietnam, but also in Afghanistan and future conflicts.[165]

The Viet Cong viewed the Chieu Hoi program as a threat and took steps to thwart it, using elaborate measures to anticipate, prevent, and offset the effects of defecting.[166] The VC attempted to prevent their members from learning about Chieu Hoi from GVN or

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[164]The Factor of trust was vital to convincing the Viet Cong to Chieu Hoi. Trust, According to General MacFarland, later in Iraq, trust was vital to convince the Sunnis to rise up against Al Qaida. The question is the level of trust that the U.S. has built in the tribal areas of Afghanistan. The assessment, currently, is not enough.

[165]Goure, xii.

[166]Carrier and Holmes Thompson, 57.

United States sources. In addition, anti propaganda efforts attempted to cast doubt on the sincerity of the GVN appeals.[167]

It is important to understand the strategic lessons that were useful in Vietnam that can possibly be applied to Afghanistan, based upon the norms and society. Security during the first years of the war prevented General Westmoreland from implementing a broader counterinsurgency approach. He was focused on the conventional threat to the host government. The lack of host nation political will resulted in an under resourced program. Reintegration worked well when insurgents felt a reason to change mainly because of targeting, family, career or economic pressures communicated and effective propaganda. Insurgents must see political will, truthful propaganda, backed by actions before changing sides. Security is vital for the defector and family. Reintegration is a cost effective program. Reconciliation relies on national will, but reintegration is executable at the local level with minimum support from the host nation central government. These lessons had applicability in Vietnam and are arguably still applicable today with adaptation to a different campaign in a different country and society.

The start of the Chieu Hoi program had challenges similar to those currently being experienced in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For both places it is proving difficult to rally host nation support for the program or for external forces to provide their best administrators. The case study argues that it is important to put in capable administrators to maintain and grow the program. Flexibility between a national reconciliation program and local reintegration is important. The local reintegration of Chieu Hoi was successful, but the national plan lacked the political will to succeed. This is critical in light of the

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[167]Koch, 17-20.

charges that the Department of State may not send its best administrators to Afghanistan. Appropriate and continuous program funding is vital. Program funding is difficult with lacking understanding of reintegration effectiveness, missing doctrine which hinders unity of effort leading to strategies and political interests at cross purposes. The resultant political turbulence and disunity of purpose jeopardize the funding stream.

CHAPTER 5

DHOFAR

Case Study Dhofar 1965-1975

The Dhofar counterinsurgency campaign was a success for the government of

Oman.[168] Many current United States Army officers would not know that there was a

successful counterinsurgency in Oman, which is a shame since Professor F.W. Becket

"described as a model counterinsurgency campaign, displaying both the fruits of

operational experience gained by the British Army since 1945, and also the flexible

British approach to such campaigns."[169] Walter Ladwig in *Supporting Allies in*

Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion goes as far as saying that the

United States analyzed the wrong war when using experiences in Vietnam for Field

Manual 3.24 Counterinsurgency and as a basis for current counterinsurgency operations

in Iraq and Afghanistan.[170] Dhofar is a better historical example for Iraq.[171] Obviously,

there are useful lessons to draw from this insurgency as well as others.[172]

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[168]Key reading for the reader that provide more detail about the Dhofar
counterinsurgency are: Ian Beckett, "The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in
Dhofar, 1965-1975," Bard O'Neill, "Revolutionary War in Oman," In *Insurgency in the
Modern World,* D. L. Price, *Oman: Insurgency and Development,* Tony Jeapes, *SAS:
Operation Oman,* and Walter Ladwig, "Supporting Allies in COIN: Britain and the
Dhofar Rebellion."

[169]Ian Beckett, "The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar, 1965-
1975," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter
Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 175.

[170]The Dhofar insurgency is fundamentally different than Vietnam. Dhofar did not
have the conventional threat that Vietnam did, not were the insurgents resourced at the
same level as Vietnam.

This case study lends itself to four reconciliation and reintegration themes discussed in chapter three. They are:

1. Omani government led the reconciliation and reintegration effort

2. Omani and external British forces maintained unity of effort

3. Setting the security conditions enabled reconciliation and reintegration

4. Maintained both Omani and British political and military will.

Some specific themes of this campaign are; a change in government leadership, the development of an effective reintegration program and the raising of *Firqas*.[173] The campaign operated in a political and economic environment of limited financial resources to buy material and the ability to raise troops.[174]

Dhofar is a mountainous area in the southern region of Oman settled by tribesmen that are fiercely independent and ethnically different than the Omani Arab community. In the 1960s repressive leadership by the Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur left the tribesman feeling separated from the central government of Oman. He was determined to prevent all of his population from having contact with the modern world. One visiting economist noted "There was great poverty and disease . . . yet nothing was done because the Sultan would

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[171]Walter Ladwig, "Supporting Allies in COIN: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 1 (March 2008): 62.

[172]FM 3-24 references Jeapes as a recommended reading source for leveraging tribes in a counterinsurgency effort. However, the doctrine does not mention that Oman is the source of key lessons learned.

[173]A local indigenous security force. More discussion of the Firqas will follow.

[174]Beckett, 180-190.

not permit it."[175] Dhofaris felt little reason to support their exploitive ruler. The unrest was fueled by the Soviets and Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) spawning a communist insurgency.[176] The insurgency gained in strength, especially after the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and the rise of Marxist-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).[177]

Initial hostilities in Dhofar were conducted by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). The goal of the senior leaders of the movement was secession of the Dhofar region from the sultanate. Its manifesto called on the poor classes to make up the mainstay of its forces. Furthermore, some leaders in the movement such as Musselim bin Nuffl acknowledge that he would settle for a political role in government along with an end to discriminatory policies of the sultan. The Marxists that were part of the movement resented this position. Ahmad al Ghassani formed an alliance with sympathetic tribal elements and seized power from bin Nuffl, while he was recovering from a wound. This seizure of power was supported by both Moscow and Peking. The 1968 DLF congress elected new leaders and adopted wider strategic objectives and scientific socialism. Furthermore, a goal became the unification of all Arabian emirates into a socialist state.

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[175]Jim White, "Oman 1965-1976: From Certain Defeat to Decisive Victory," *Small Wars Journal* (2008), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/93-white.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010), 3.

[176]Research Team, *Reintegration and Reconciliation-Theory and Practice*, C-1.

[177]White, 4.

The movement was appropriately renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).[178]

The insurgency adopted Marxism. These measures encountered strong resistance by tribesmen, because they violated tribal and religious customs. These stresses contributed to defections from the insurgent movement. The defections undermined the insurgency's effort to become a nationwide movement. The effect was that the movement was not able to translate its efforts from a small geographic area to nationwide insurgency with widespread popular support.[179]

Beckett argued that the Omani counterinsurgency was won primarily through the development of an effective campaign plan and superior execution. The counter argument is that the enemy may have had something to do with the Marxist insurgent defeat.[180] Bard O'Neill argues in *Revolutionary War in Oman* that "once the insurgent movement took a Marxist turn and began to implement measures oppugnant [sic] to tribal values and customs, traditional resistance led to stresses in and defections from the PFLO."[181] This led to "the emergence of dissention within its own ranks, the PFLOAG undertook a reprisal strategy."[182] It followed that the insurgency separated itself from the popular

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[178]Bard O'Neill, "Revolutionary War in Oman," in *Insurgency in the Modern World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 216-217.

[179]Ibid., 220.

[180]The argument is that the Dhofari insurgency was splitting internally, because Communism and its Marxist ideology did not identify well with the local culture. Omani propaganda exploited that rift. But, there is an argument that the insurgency defeated itself.

[181]O'Neill, "Revolutionary War in Oman," 220.

[182]Ibid., 217.

support base that it needed in order to succeed. The PFLO leader Masud "attributed the inability to mobilize the people to an overemphasis on military training and action...[which] was more reflective of Cuban "military foco" strategy than Maoist people's war approach professed by the PFLO."[183]

With Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur unwilling to change his leadership style, Qaboos, a Sandhurst educated officer, witnessed the country slip into a growing insurgency. The need for change was apparent from an internal Sultan of Oman Armed Forces assessment in 1970. The assessment concluded that there was no coherent plan to combat the insurgency. There were no plans considered counterinsurgency essential. In 1970, Sultan Qaboos deposed his father Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur, with British support and initiated a more comprehensive approach to the Omani counterinsurgency strategy.

The first significant change was the development of an operational plan to support the strategy. It consists of five areas:

1. Collection of intelligence

2. Creation of an information service to disseminate government news

3. Medical assistance

4. Veterinary facilities for cattle stock

5. Direct involvement of the Dhofaris in their own defense. [184]

In addition, Sultan Qaboos laid out his plan to split the insurgents from the insurgency. He announced a broad five-point plan:

1. General amnesty for all subjects that had opposed the Sultan

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[183]Ibid., 222.

[184]Beckett, 180.

2. Ending status of Dhofar province and including it in the state of Oman

3. Conducting effective military operations against insurgents that did not accept amnesty and reintegrate

4. Various development programs to improve lives of citizens

5. Diplomatic initiative to recognize Oman by other Arab states as the legal government and isolating PDRY from other Arab state support.[185]

Strategically, Sultan Qaboos quickly realized that he could defend key cities, but that military and security forces were unable to defeat the insurgency. He understood that he could not kill his way to a victory. Instead, he decided to strategically reconcile with the tribes in order to bring them back into the political process. His objective was not to reconcile making the PFLOAG a legitimate political group. Instead the strategy was to provide the Dhofaris with a choice.[186] On one hand, they could choose a communist political and economic ideology with which they no cultural identity and would benefit little from or on the other hand support the legitimate government reinforcing their culture and concerned about their needs.[187]

The development and rapid implementation of the campaign plan led to the rise of the Firqas. The Firqa were an indigenous Omani irregular force in support of the government of Oman. Many former SEPs came back and joined the Firqa as well. The British support strategy employed logistically smaller, but highly trained Special Air

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[185]White, 6.

[186]Research Team, *Reintegration and Reconciliation-Theory and Practice*, C-1.

[187]Dhofar SAS veterans, Interview by Major Karsten Haake, 20 October 2010. Interviews were confidential: The names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement

Service (SAS) force because of limited national resources.[188] The effects of security and

amnesty in light of the new non-culturally based Marxist ideology adopted by the Peoples

Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) increased the rate of defection

from the insurgents. Security and infrastructure improvements mutually reinforced one

another and the Dhofaris were given a choice. Improved security and infrastructure

improvements built mutual trust.[189]

Cultural factors increased defection, improved intelligence and security. Marxist

ideology did not resonate with tribal, ethnic, religious cultural or regional values.[190] It

follows that the Marxist narrative undermined the base of support that the insurgency had

with the population. The high rate of defections led to better intelligence. Improved

intelligence resulted in effective targeting and supply interdiction.[191]

Investment in equipment and training proved critical to improving security force

capabilities. Increased funding, through increasing oil revenues led to better Sultan of

Oman Armed Forces (SAF) equipment. Combined with investments in leadership

training, this improved Sultan of Oman Armed Forces capabilities.[192]

The Omani government was effective in separating the insurgent from their

popular base by addressing local grievances, exploiting ideological fault lines, building

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[188]This is similar reality not far removed from the reality of the planning environment in Afghanistan 2005.

[189]Dhofar SAS veterans, Interview.

[190]O'Neill, "Revolutionary War in Oman," 218.

[191]Dhofar SAS veterans, Interview.

[192]Ibid.

medical capacity and rural economic development on the *jebel* and providing amnesty and a way out for people to surrender restoring honor to a family by becoming part of the Firqa. Psychological and informational operations took advantage of the widening fault lines between the Dhaforis and Marxist ideology.[193] As Omani capabilities improved, conventional defensive lines were built to interdict insurgent supply movements to and around the *jebel* causing further degradation in insurgent operational capabilities.[194]

There are four key lessons learned from the Dhofar Insurgency. They are make the population choose, reconciliation, rebuilding trust and the indispensability of military operations. The militants had a choice to either support the existing political system or the insurgency. The government convinced the insurgents that their future was better served under Sultan Qaboos.

Dhofar achieved an effective national reconciliation program when Sultan Qaboos offered amnesty to all insurgents in Oman. A factor that affects the national political will to execute a national reconciliation program is the level of political fragmentation in a government. The more fragmented and divided a national government, the less likely it will have the resolve to reconcile on a national level. If the central government is politically fragmented it may still execute a regional or provincial reintegration program with limited national support similar to Vietnam. It is easier to initiate a national reconciliation program in a non-democratic system.

Counterinsurgents reverse the choices of insurgents. They do this by building trust through security measures and infrastructure development. Trust is built between the host

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[193]Dhofar SAS veterans, Interview.

[194]Beckett, 189-190.

nation and the insurgent. Trust provides the basis for either strategic national reconciliation or local tactical reintegration. Reconciliation is a host nation mission, the British, could not dictate it, but they advised and supported it. Patience is vital in rebuilding trust as a counterinsurgency, because there will be mistakes, setbacks and failures.[195] The military cannot win strategically alone without a political process.[196]

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[195]Dhofar SAS veterans, Interview.

[196]Research Team, *Reintegration and Reconciliation-Theory and Practice*, C1-C2.

CHAPTER 6

CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (COP)

Case Study Iraq 2004-2010

The Iraqi insurgency has evolved. Three positive developments characterized the counterinsurgency campaign. First, the struggle to build a viable military and police force that is able to provide security to the population is gaining momentum. Second, security forces were able to maintain pressure through targeting insurgents. Third, responsibility for security in Iraq was transferred to the host nation government. However, Iraq still struggles in three areas essential to executing reconciliation and reintegration. First, Iraq must continue to lead the reconciliation effort. Second, the Iraqi government and the U.S. must continue to maintain unity of effort in reconciliation and reintegration. Third, Iraq and the U.S. must continue to maintain the political and military will to promote the conditions necessary to reconcile and reintegrate.

In 2009-10, military and political momentum has shifted in favor of the counterinsurgent forces. However, as General David Petraeus noted before Congress on CSPAN "all gains are reversible."[197]

Some contributing causes that undermined the ability of the Iraqi government to initiate reconciliation and reintegration potentially lay in the lack of planning for the invasion, confusion after and failed understanding about the cultural reasons fueling the insurgency.[198]

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[197]General Petraeus Confirmation Hearing, CSPAN, 29 June 2010.

[198]Hughes, Interview.

Planning for the post invasion period was flawed. According to Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock there was no plan to resource the development of a post combat transition phase. This post combat transition phase is known as a Phase IV. The reason for this was twofold. First, there were not enough facts to initiate a solid Phase IV plan.[199] Second, the military in training usually focused on Phase III combat operations and resisted in planning training for Phase IV.[200]

At the strategic level, Paul Hughes (USIP) provides some observations on the planning leading up to the Iraq invasion and Iraqi culture that would later give the United States some significant challenges. Initial operations were planned almost entirely as a conventional combat operation, not a war with a protracted insurgency.[201] This lack of transition planning was similar to the previous Operation Desert Storm. It is a mistake that would repeat itself.[202] The Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's military concept was that this would be a standard high intensity combat operation, followed by a rapid draw-down to 20,000 soldiers followed by a transfer of responsibility to the Department of State. This relied on many assumptions, because U.S. intelligence did not have sufficient information on the functions and processes of the Iraqi government or military.

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[199]Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where the Wars are Really Won," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 27-28.

[200]Crane, 11.

[201]Wright and Reese, 568.

[202]According to LTC Conrad Crane, Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock complained that he could not get staff support to plan for the post conflict phase. Neither the Army or the Department of Defense. Civilian agencies were even more unprepared..The original source for his conclusion was Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1999).

No one really knew how many ministries there were and how they interacted. His insights support the argument that there was a large degree of confusion about the structure of the Iraqi society and government.[203]

The development of host nation political will was undermined initially by U.S. effort. As the United States entered and secured Iraq, the subsequent economic and governmental development of the country was heavily politicized. The individuals chosen to run selected ministries and programs were selected because of their political motivations and connections rather than their technical knowledge. Iraqi politicians and administrators soon descended into gridlock because of competing political priorities and lacking government administrative.[204]

The gridlock was confounded by the lack of knowledge; the United States knew little had about the structure and functions of the Iraqi government outside of the military, ministry of defense and ministry of interior. The United States countered this problem by installing United States/British expatriate advisory teams with the goal to keep the ministries running. At the same time, the U.S. removed capable administrators in when they purged the first two to three layers of Ba'athist party members. As the United States attempted to assign advisory teams to ministries, new ministries would pop up.[205] This increased the Phase IV confusion.

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[203]AA801, Interview; AA1006, Interview.

[204]AA801, Interview; AA811, Interview.

[205]AA811, Interview.

Security in Iraq quickly deteriorated with the chaotic political system, decapitated ministries and a disbanded military.[206] According to USIP what made the situation initially so dangerous was that no one knew what they were dealing with in 2003. In May 2003 USIP recommended that the Coalition "get the Iraqi Army into our tent."[207] However, Ambassador Bremer would not allow it.[208]

Uneven leadership resulted in poor initial planning for the invasion. Hugh's criticism was that under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's leadership created cognitive dissonance.[209] There was a drive to reduce the amount of disagreement about invading Iraq. The plan was a quick invasion, with minimum force. After military victory, matters would quickly transition to the Department of State and the military could reduce to less than 20,000 Soldiers in Iraq for security. A few senior leaders explained that there were too many cultural and political unknowns in Iraq and that these prevented the formulation of a coherent plan after military action; these objections fell on deaf ears.[210]

The result was that senior leaders principally in the military and the Department of State gave the go ahead to the President for the invasion.[211] Thus, there was no

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[206]The U.S. political narrative was that they would not allow the Bathists to stay within the government or the military. There was a critical lack of U.S. understanding of the Iraqi government and why an Iraqi would be part of the Bathist government.

[207]Hughes, Interview.

[208]AA801, Interview.

[209]Hughes, Interview.

[210]AA801, Interview; AA1006, Interview; Hughes, Interview.

[211]Hughes, Interview.

anticipation of an insurgency in Iraq or a contingency plan on how to end an insurgency if one should occur. USIP's critical point was missed and it is vital that critical and dissenting voices are heard and concerns addressed.[212]

Decisions made initially by senior military commanders and the Coalition Provisional Authority added fuel to the fire of a growing insurgency in Iraq. After the fall of Baghdad, the United States decided on debaathification, the forced democratization of Iraq and the construction of a largely Shi'a army. These efforts, started in May 2003, had the predictable effect of sparking the Ba'athist Sunni minority opposition to the CPA and the future Shi'a Iraqi government. The wholesale separation of the Sunni minority from the political process started and later fueled the insurgency.[213] Most of the insurgents were Sunni Arabs who lived in Baghdad and western Iraq. The narrative that fueled the Sunni insurgency was:

1. To compel the United States to include Sunni's in the most powerful political positions

2. Opposition to the Shi'a leaders that help positions in the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council

3. Opposition to the dissolution of the Iraqi Army and the prohibition of members of the Ba'ath party from holding positions or participating in government.[214]

At the same time, the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda, led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, exploited

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[212]Hughes, Interview.

[213]AA801, Interview; AA1006, Interview; Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 287.

[214]Malkasian, "The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in Counterinsurgency," 371.

this instability to create its own Islamic narrative with the goal to support further

international Al Qaeda operations.[215] Al Qaeda propaganda drew insurgent fighters to

Iraq and provided propaganda undermining the legitimacy of the Iraqi national

government.[216] 2003 and 2004 found the Iraqi government fragmented and divided along

sectarian lines. It was unable to maintain neither infrastructure capacity nor provide

security in any meaningful way. The CPA mistakenly believed it could form a coherent

political will through imposed democratization. However, the Sunnis naturally viewed

this version of democracy as one dictated by the victors and without legitimacy or

support from the Sunni minority.[217]

The foremost goal of the Bush administration was the democratization of Iraq.[218]

In that effort Ambassador Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA), moved ahead according to that priority. He felt that this effort was an appropriate

strategy to combat the influence of the most extreme parts of the Sunni resistance

movements such as the one led by Zarqawi.[219]

The U.S, civilian leadership's flawed planning for the war and reconstruction

were a primary cause for what was to come.[220] The complete lack of understanding

[215]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 287-288.

[216]Wright and Reese, 110.

[217]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 309-310.

[218]Wright and Reese, 12.

[219]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 288.

[220]Brian Burton and John Nagl, "Learning as we go: the US Army adapts to COIN in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 303.

insurgency and counterinsurgency from the civilian leadership and General Sanchez in 2003, John Nagl states, resulted in an incoherent strategy that was counterproductive. In addition, counterproductive operations and tactics continued to undermine any hope of reconciliation and fueled the narrative fires for an insurgency.[221] Some leaders clung to the belief that the insurgency was simply the last stand of Ba'athist extremists and not a coherent start of a Sunni insurgent movement. The combination of factors such as lack of planning, inability to recognize the insurgency sooner, disunity of command, along with poor command and control were decisive in condemning any early actions against the insurgency to failure.[222] The situation was exacerbated by Lieutenant General Sanchez's lack of guidance to divisional commanders, which left many divisions and brigades to their own devices. This meant that operational efforts were a patchwork of conventional or non-conventional actions that made it nearly impossible to determine what was or was not working to stabilize the conflict.[223]

In 2003-2004, security in Iraq deteriorated significantly. It was clear to both the military commanders and the CPA that local forces could not secure Iraq and that more United States forces were needed.[224] In addition, there was a belief by both civilian and military leadership that the increase of United States forces in Iraq would add to the perception of occupation.[225] This request for more troops was a problem. It was a

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[221]Wright and Reese, 113-114.

[222]Ibid., 141-143.

[223]Burton and Nagl, 304.

[224]Wright and Reese, 99-118.

[225]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 293.

politically inconvenient because domestic political messages characterized the conflict in Iraq as "mission accomplished." The official narrative was that Iraqis were now ready to take control of their own country. With CPA-dictated democratic revolution, this strategy was sure to bring fundamental change to Iraq and bring the troops home in time for domestic mid-term elections. A contrary admission that more troops were needed in Iraq would undermine the U.S. political will in support the President and inflame the growing insurgency.[226]

In an effort to increase security, General Abizaid, subordinate American commanders, and the CPA looked to form a local defense force to augment the number of Coalition forces available. This was known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which was later became part of the Iraqi National Army in June 2004. The ICDC was designed as a stop gap to reduce the amount of violence currently in Iraq, and serve as the predominant security element, while the Iraqi Army was rebuilt.[227]

Cultural and ethnic division prevented inclusivity, a component of reconciliation, in the government and military. Host nation internal sectarian divisions made early internal political compromise on reconciliation and reintegration impossible. In western Iraq, progress was slow against the insurgency from March 2004 to March 2005. The factors that slowed the process were the absence of meaningful reform by the Coalition, and the failure of the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) to address Sunni grievances of political and economic inequality. In addition, the Sunnis perceived that the insurgency

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[226]David Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 120-121.

[227]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 293.

would outlast United States efforts and those of the new Iraqi government. The result-perceptions of inherent weakness because of lacking capacity, national and military will-fueled the insurgency in western Iraq and allowed it to gain strength.[228]

In 2004, the United States started to form an Iraqi national sovereign government creating the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) under the leadership of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi on 28 June 2004. At the same time there were significant military leadership challenges resulting in a change in the counterinsurgency strategy. General Ricardo Sanchez was replaced by General George Casey as the commander of the new Multi National Forces, Iraq (MNF-I). At the same time, General David Petraeus arrived in Iraq to implement and lead the creation of the new Iraqi security forces as the commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).[229]

The strategy under General George Casey changed immediately. Casey's focus was to convince the Iraqis to build capacity, provide security and make this their conflict and placing them the lead. Casey believed the proximate cause for the insurgency was the presence of United States forces. Thus, his goal became reducing external forces in Iraq, before security was successfully established. John Nagl states that "if the failure of Sanchez's command lay in the overemphasis on the use of force, Casey's was in underestimating the utility of force in counterinsurgency."[230] A bi-product of the external force reduction was the mixed message that the U.S. lacked political and military will.

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[228]Malkasian, "The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in Counterinsurgency," 367.

[229]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 294.

[230]Burton and Nagl, 305.

The effect in Iraq was to convince insurgents to hedge their futures with Al Qaeda and subvert the existing U.S.-supported government. Mixed messages and lack of trust prevented any national level reconciliation. The only possibility now would be for a local reintegration program unsupported by the national government.

In late 2004, Casey initiated a campaign review, which was guided by counterinsurgency expert Kalev Sepp. Sepp produced a best practices paper, which emphasized the necessity of population control, political development, training indigenous security forces, and a single executive authority for successful counterinsurgency.[231] These included instructive lessons learned by the British in Malaya and other campaigns.

According to John Nagl "the campaign plan that Casey developed did not emphasize counterinsurgency principles as much as "Iraqization", a transition from American to Iraqi responsibility for security."[232] Casey wanted to transition authority for security over to the provinces. This transition occurred in an environment where political negotiations took precedence over military offensives. Insurgents recognized that the government would fail after the U.S. left.

The operational situation started to change in Western and southern Iraq in August 2004. The battle of Najaf and the suppression of the Mahdi army removed the potential for a united Sunni and Shi'a resistance.[233] The success of conventional

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[231]Ibid., 306.

[232]Ibid., 305.

[233]Malkasian, "The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in Counterinsurgency," 383.

Coalition forces in Fallujah November 2004 undermined the insurgents' belief in a conventional victory.

The presence of Iraqi and Coalition patrols in urban areas caused insurgents to lower their operational tempo and reappraise their chances of success. Successful nationwide elections undermined moderate Sunni morale.[234]

As the actions in Iraq continued, there was a changing mindset in United States military leaders. Major General Peter Chiarelli commented on the requirements for full spectrum operation in Iraq in 2005. He wrote that long term security is not brought by kinetic action but instead is "grounded in a democratic process."[235] Some argue that it was the democratic process that caused the insurgency and this led to a civil war. However, it may be shortsighted to look at the term "democratic" from strictly the western view point. Instead democracy in Iraq refers more to the process of inclusion into a political process.[236]

Chiarelli realized that kinetics only provided a short term victory at the expense of long term gains.[237] Chiarelli's strategy was to get a "fence sitter" to commit to the side of the legitimate government. Similar to the situation in Dhofar, in Iraq it was about choice. Chiarelli realized that imprecise lethal kinetic actions undermined that effort. Fence

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[234]Malkasian, "The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in Counterinsurgency," 383.

[235]Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, "The Requirements for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (July-August 2005): 4.

[236]Ibid., 6.

[237]Ibid., 8.

sitters were "waiting on clear signs of progress before casting their support"[238] By gaining momentum, it was hoped, the counterinsurgency efforts would gain critical mass, turning fence sitters from neutrality to supporting the government. This idea was key to the future of Iraq in places such as Tal Afar, al Qa'im and Al Anbar.

Conventional operations that undermine the insurgents' will to fight are one of the pillars to building a reconciliation and reintegration program. From Malaya to Vietnam, continuous targeting of insurgents has proven a significant factor in convincing fighters to reconcile or reintegrate. In 2005, there were continuous conventional battles under Colonel McMaster in Tal Afar. Lieutenant Colonel Alford commanded "Operation Steel Curtain" in November 2005, with the goal of clearing Al Qa'im. The result was the Army and Marines killed a large numbers of. The military realized for the first time that what happened after the battle dictated future success.

Reconciliation and reintegration begins by building trust. In Tal Afar no civilians were killed during the battle. McMaster placed 29 outposts throughout the city and saturated the neighborhoods with patrols, increasing security and building trust with the local population. With trust, McMaster was able to generate effective intelligence with the cooperation of the Shi'a minority. Sunnis still considered the Iraqi Army and police as their enemy. Because of trust, McMaster was able to get Shi'a to serve as a local police force.[239]

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[238]Ibid., 6.

[239]Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland Part III of III, 19 February 2008, Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Mirroring the situation in Tal Afar, Lieutenant Colonel Dale Alford, commander of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment also placed his Marines in twelve combat outposts in al Qa'im.[240] In addition, he integrated his Marines with the Iraqi Army brigade there, which included Sunnis and former Republican Guard officers.[241] As in Tal Afar, intensive patrols created trust with the population and it generated intelligence.[242] This was a factor later in convincing the Abu Mahal tribe to keep AQI out. The demonstrated military will and trust improved security in Al Qa'im, which raised 700 tribesmen to join the Iraqi army brigade and 400 for the new police force.[243] Trust creating operations leveraged the local population for better security.[244]

Leaders, both Coalition and Sunni, realized only peaceful negotiations could remove the Coalition and improve Sunni fortunes.[245] Some Sunni insurgent groups splintered off and sought reconciliation with Coalition and the Iraqi Transitional Government. Additional Sunni insurgent groups approached President Jalal al Talabani during the reconciliation conference in Cairo, Egypt in November 2005 to open peace negotiations.[246]

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[240]AA907, Interview.

[241]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 298.

[242]AA907, Interview.

[243]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 299.

[244]AA907, Interview.

[245]Malkasian, "The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in Counterinsurgency," 385.

[246]Ibid., 282-285.

In February 2005, the Coalition confirmed the plan for a final withdrawal and plans to turn over counterinsurgency efforts to the Iraqis. President Bush resisted setting a timetable for withdrawal in order to not undermine the strategy.

While national political reform process gained traction in Iraq in 2005, some insurgent groups took political reconciliation as a signal of weakness. Malkasian states "by proving independence prior to the suppression of the insurgency, the transfer of sovereignty induced insurgents to expect the Interim Iraqi Government to be weak; unsupported by the Coalition."[247] He states that political reform is critical to successful counterinsurgency. In order to execute political reform the insurgent perceptions must change, so that moderate insurgents no longer believe that violence achieves political goals. Therefore, security must exist at a level to ensure survival. The government must provide something of value to the population if it is to have any relevance. The government must seek inclusiveness in a political system in which all parties gain more together than they do apart. This relies on trust. Ethnic and cultural divisions undermine trust. Multicultural trust-building efforts are therefore essential. Trust in the government, along with capable security forces, places a government in a position of strength while reconciling.[248]

In 2006 the Coalition was plagued by setbacks and a civil war. As John Nagl states "in spite of the increasing commitment to counterinsurgency principles, 2006 was marked not by triumph for Iraqi and United States forces employing Galula's methods,

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[247]Ibid., 388.

[248]Research Team, *Reintegration and Reconciliation-Theory and Practice*, 10-11, 14.

but by armed sectarian extremists slaughtering civilians with impunity and questions of whether Iraq had entered a period of civil war between Sunnis and Shi'as."[249] While the United States was experiencing operational success in both Tal Afar and Al Qa'im, the killing of 24 civilians in Haditha on 19 November 2005, with little to no investigation, significantly broke trust and set back Coalition gains in raising the legitimacy of government and Coalition forces. In addition, the use of air strikes, detention of civilians, accusations of torture, escalation of force incidents, and potential contractor abuse continually frustrated the military leadership.[250]

In terms of progress towards reconciliation, it is evident that Iraq was not yet able to provide its own security, harness political unity to implement a reconciliation plan or resource the plan financially. It is also unclear how effective Casey's personal visits were in changing subordinate commanders' behaviors and their view on appropriate tactics. Interestingly, almost a third of the Soldiers and Marines stated that their commander did not make clear that harming of civilians was unacceptable.[251]

Amnesty is primarily a civil function that brings people back into the legitimate host nation political process. Al Anbar and the Chieu Hoi program had components of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration. In 2005 in Al Anbar, the reintegration at the tactical level was principally with United States and local forces and not the national

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[249]Burton and Nagl, 320.

[250]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 300.

[251]Ibid.

government.[252] The national reconciliation of Sunni fighters into the predominantly Shiite and Kurdish political process was at best "rough."

Iraq counterinsurgency planning and execution was led largely by external forces, as demonstrated by General Casey's focus on U.S. efforts, with little Iraqi ownership. The Iraqi's lack of capability to improve the security and fractured governance affecting infrastructure improvements caused the Iraqi government to focus on the short term rather than the long term goal of reconciliation and reintegration.[253]

The argument that simply providing security with infrastructure improvements will defeat an insurgency similar to Malaya is flawed. In Malaya the insurgent was ethnically different and the counterinsurgent forces were able to forcibly separate and control the population. That is a strategy not available to the U.S. In addition, at the current force level, unlike Malaya, it also became unaffordable.[254] The only option was to convert the insurgent either through reconciliation or reintegration.

Some commanders did not realize that securing the population, holding key terrain and building government capacity were vital to building trust. Casey made an effort to visit brigades and divisions and bring them on board with his vision of "clear-hold-build." However, he was not always successful. United States commanders enjoyed large operational freedoms largely due to the decentralized command and control structure developed as part of a conventional conflict. This resulted in continued conventional operations designed to clear areas. Instead of moving into the populated

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[252]Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland Part III of III.

[253]AA809, Interview.

[254]Miller, Interview.

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areas and protecting the population, some battalions moved away from urban centers into large United States bases.[255] Faced with uncertain situations and unproven doctrine, commanders reverted back to experience in conventional combat.

Lack of Iraqi political unity was evident as the sectarian divide continued to grow in 2005. Political unity is essential for reconciliation. The election results caused a widening in Iraq. The October 2005 referendum would have allowed federalism, the result denying Sunnis access to oil revenues. While the Sunnis came out to vote in December 2005, the Shi'a still maintained a majority in the legislative body of the government. The result of these elections was Sunnis who did not believe that the democratic government reflected their needs or addressed their grievances. They felt marginalized.[256]

The security situation in 2006, slid from bad to worse around the area of Baghdad. The Iraqi Army was unable to provide competent soldiers in large enough numbers needed to quell the sectarian violence. The Coalition appeared to be indirectly seeding control of the capital to Shi'a militias. Violence against Sunnis escalated. Shi'a on Sunni violence continued, while AQI escalated their wave of terror with large bombings.[257]

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[255]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 300.

[256]Ibid., 301.

[257]Ibid., 301-303

Al Anbar and Initial Reintegration in Iraq from 2006

Although the level of violence was increasing in Baghdad and the situation was dire throughout most of the country, there was a glimmer of hope. In 2006, there was an uprising by Sunni tribes in Al Anbar province against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The Coalition forces had attempted to enlist the help of the local tribes with little effect as early as 2005. These efforts included Special Forces initiatives and Marine General Mattis' efforts with CAP platoons in 2004.[258] The key tipping point for the Sunni Al Anbar tribes was the AQI takeover of political and economic power, especially smuggling activities within the tribes. AQI undermined the tribal leadership. The first tribal leader-Albu Mahal in Al Qa'im-turned in 2005. Critical mass was reached when Sheikh Abd al Sitta Bezia Ftikhan al Rishawi initiated a tribal movement called Sahawa Al Anbar.[259]

Sahawa Al Anbar reinforced the locally recruited police in the provinces, which improved intelligence necessary to target insurgents. Between 2006 and 2007, the number of police in al Anbar increased from 1,000 to over 7,000. Most tribes aligned themselves with the tribal movement by April 2007 and the police had effectively quelled insurgent violence.[260]

Key leaders such as Colonel Sean MacFarland could not possibly be unaware of all factors that caused the uprising against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, they drew three conclusions. First, United States commanders felt that the AQI enemy AQI

[258]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 303.

[259]Ibid., 304.

[260]Ibid.

overplayed their hand and that the tribes had started to become frustrated with AQI the excesses.[261] A series of assassinations, for unknown reasons, against tribal leaders had elevated younger tribal leaders to positions of authority. Second, military commanders countered local fears with military will. Locals feared that a Coalition pull out would leave these tribes at the mercy of both AQI and Shi'a Iranian supported militias.[262] Colonel MacFarland countered by stating that "instead of telling [the Sunni sheiks] that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message that they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change."[263] Third, Colonel MacFarland identifies a key to convincing young Sunni leaders to join the counterinsurgency: "our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice from sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us."[264]

Colonel MacFarland leveraged full spectrum operations in Ramadi with support from the Marines in 2006 to "operate seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation,

[261]Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland Part III of III.

[262]Ibid.

[263]Burton and Nagl, 223.

[264]Neil Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," *Military Review* (March/April 2008): 51.

close air support, and riverine unit."[265] Although kinetically aggressive, MacFarland also realized that "the tribes represent the people of Iraq, and the populace represents the "key terrain" of the conflict. The force that supports the population by taking the moral high ground has as sure an advantage in counterinsurgency as a maneuver commander who occupies dominant terrain in battle."[266] Finally, to win over the insurgents and maintain control of the population as key terrain, "the counterinsurgents must demonstrate staying power if they are to break the grip of militants over the population."[267]

General McFarland, in 2006, made it clear that a critical piece to encouraging the Sons of Iraq to act was the U.S. commitment to stay the course. The message to the sheiks of Al Anbar prior to the Sunni Awakening was that the Coalition forces will leave and that their presence is transient. Al Qaeda's message was that they would stay forever and even make the area into their new caliphate. Al Qaeda's message to the sheiks of Anbar was clear: Al Qaeda would stay. General McFarland changed the Coalition message thereby demonstrating military will by letting the sheiks know that U.S. forces were not leaving and would fight side by side with the Sunnis until Al Qaeda is defeated. To demonstrate that will, General MacFarland placed combat outposts in the Jazeera and tribal areas.[268]

The perception of military commitment to support the Anbar Awakening was critical in initiating and maintaining the security momentum which in turn set the

[265]Ibid., 51.

[266]Ibid., 52.

[267]Burton and Nagl, 323.

[268]Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland Part III of III.

conditions for subsequent reconciliation and reintegration. However, the process of reconciliation and reintegration was not smooth. The reconciliation and reintegration plan between the Sons of Iraq, sheiks and their tribes was poorly coordinated between the host nation Iraqi government and the Coalition military. The poor coordination and lack of host nation political will to reconcile and reintegrate Sunnis manifested itself in the poorly executed reintegration program.

There were two significant problems demobilizing the Sons of Iraq which appeared to make matters worse. First, the coalition military could not create the Iraqi Security Forces. Second, the host nation had little desire to incorporate the SOI into the ISF. The result was that reintegrated SOI were given projects such as short term maintenance and cleaning roads, paid through the Flexible Maintenance Worker Program not the Iraqi government. SOI wanted to join the legitimate ISF, but were prevented because of lacking Iraqi national political will.[269]

Political will affects amnesty in Iraq. The Anbar Awakening had no published or nationally agreed upon amnesty programs. The local Anbar courts were lenient towards any crimes that Sons of Iraq had committed. If there was no local court, amnesty was conducted by local sheiks, tribal justice and the local Iraqi military commander.[270] Iraq lacked the capability and the will to establish a court system that implemented national amnesty, which is necessary in order to effectively reintegrate fighters and achieve

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[269]United States Army Major Nathan Minami, 2-10 IBCT Brigade Planner and Battalion Operations Officer, Iraq 2010, Interview by Major Jan Gleiman, Fort Drum, New York, 17 September 2010.

[270]United States Army First Lieutenant Steven Warner, Platoon Leader A/4-31, Interview by Major Mike Dinesman, Fort Drum, New York, 17 September 2010.

national reconciliation. The problem with decentralized and uncoordinated court systems or tribal justice is that reconciled and reintegrated insurgents may be in jeopardy of not having a nationally recognized status as they move from one tribe, district or province to another. Political will is vital in shaping the governmental tools such as court systems that are necessary to carry out an effective reconciliation and reintegration policy.

At the operational level and below, there are some tactical lessons that illustrate how external security forces can support setting the conditions for reconciliation or aiding the host nation reconciliation effort. CSM Carl Ashmead underscores that the importance of women in a host nation reconciliation program. They urged men in Iraq to stop fighting for many reasons, among them the consistent targeting.[271] In 2009 the Iraqi Army (along with US forces) created a High Value Individual (HVI) target list that was inadvertently released. Because of pressure from women, several Iraqis in the community approached the Iraqis to reconcile in order to be removed from the target list. This was not the original intent of the target list, but the end result was better.[272] At the same time Soldiers patrolled with Iraqis, the Iraqis themselves were leading local meetings developing host nation government legitimacy, development and security essential to the development of eventual reconciliation.[273] The lesson was clear, the influence of women positively impacts reconciliation.

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[271]United States Army Command Sergeant Major Carl A. Ashmead, Senior Enlisted Leader 2-14 Infantry Battalion, Iraq 2010, Interview by Major Mike Dinesman, Fort Drum, New York, 20 September 2010.

[272]United States Army Major Jim Lockridge, Engineer Officer serving in Iraq 2003 to 2005, 2009, Interview by Major Brian McCarthy, Fort Riley, Kansas, 17 August 2010.

[273]Windmiller, Interview.

For the population to believe that reconciliation and reintegration is a host nation initiative, it must have the performance credibility to support that belief. In Iraq, there were significant differences between promises and delivery. Colonel Dale Alford made the same point. Promises in both Iraq and Afghanistan are ineffective by themselves; actions of the host nation on behalf of population produce results. Promises without substance are quickly discredited, undermining capabilities and ultimately compromising the host nation government's legitimacy. In Al Anbar, amnesty was given at the right place and at the right time, to lead to an operational success. However, U.S. led reintegration was offered to the Sons of Iraq with government employment only on paper. Frustratingly, the host nation provided career did not correlate to the former insurgents skill set. Thus, at the U.S. operational level the initial reconciliation, reintegration program in Iraq's intent was good. Lacking host nation reconciliation and reintegration ownership were the underlying reason that the promises were not kept by the central government. The Ministry of Interior of Iraq had no intention of reconciling with the Sons of Iraq.[274] The reason was that the host nation government perceived that many Sons of Iraq members were criminal and undeserving of a new start. The Sons of Iraq had essentially reconciled with external forces and not the host nation. This example highlights that who you reconcile with matters, it is difficult to support a reconciliation effort not host nation lead and the importance of unity of effort on part of the host nation and eternal forces to support a reconciliation and reintegration program

Reconciliation requires education of U.S. force on its importance. The education needs to link reconciliation to an effective reintegration program. Throwing reconciled

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[274]Warner, Interview.

insurgents into jail will cause the reconciliation program to fail.[275] It is important that the host nation set guideline with whom to reconcile. It is also important to target the correct insurgents for reconciliation. It is important to remember that reconciliation is strategic and that the target is not the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) emplacer, but instead senior leaders in an insurgent organization.[276]

The changing domestic national politics in the United States with a Republican defeat in the midterm elections in 2006 indicated the political liability of the war if the war could not be brought to a successful close. The Iraq study group lead by prominent Americans such as James Baker, and Lee Hamilton recommended increased training and expansion of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. In addition, the study recommended the development of benchmarks to more effectively measure the successes or failures of initiatives especially in the areas of political reconciliation and stabilization of Iraq's relations with neighboring countries.[277]

The "Surge" was one result of the Iraq study group. President Bush replaced General George Casey with General David Petraeus. General David Petraeus implemented across the theater some of the best lessons of Tal Afar, Al Qa'im, and Ramadi with support from the Field Manual 3-24. General David Petraeus' focus was to protect and control the people. He implemented Operation Fard al Qantum, which was the Baghdad security plan. He moved United States and Iraqi soldiers into 50 small Combat Outposts (COPS) in the city. For a short time, his efforts focused on protecting

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[275]The negative impact of this policy is discussed in the Afghanistan chapter.

[276]Senior Special Forces Commander, Interview.

[277]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 304.

the people ahead of building the Iraqi Army. Petraeus' view was that in the short term security had to generate breathing space if political reconciliation, another one of his objectives, was to take hold.[278]

"The Surge" is credited towards successfully allowing the U.S. to transition its military out of Iraq. Although marked by an initial rise in violence, the overall violence level started to subside in 2007 to 2008. The level of violence dropped from over 1,500 incidents in 2007 to just fewer than 200 in August of 2008. Petraeus formulated specific counterinsurgency guidance for Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), which listed key aspects in the counterinsurgency campaign. They were

1. Secure the people where they sleep, give them people justice

2. Integrate civil/military efforts-this is an interagency combined arms fight

3. Get out and walk–move mounted, work dismounted

4. We are in the fight for intelligence–all the time

5. Every unit must advise their ISF partners

6. Include ISF in your operations at the lowest possible level\Look beyond the IED–get the network that placed it

7. Be the first with truth

8. Make the people choose[279]

The successes in Baghdad along with the al Anbar awakening started to reached national critical mass in western and central Iraq. The reconciliation process between

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[278]Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 304.

[279]Ibid., 305.

Sunnis and the military was occurring and moving in the correct direction.[280]A result of the reconciliation was the reintegration of Sunnis as the Sons of Iraq (SoI), a Sunni security movement. These were local security forces that worked alongside United States Army, Marine and Iraqi Security Forces. The Sons of Iraq spread from Al Anbar to other regions of Iraq as well.[281] Malkasian concludes that "the Surge" and "the Awakening" gave breathing space to Iraqis and Coalition in order for reconciliation to take place.

Iraq resulted in several lessons learned:

1. Lacking intelligence of Iraq social and political structures and cognitive dissonance prevented effective planning towards reconciliation and reintegration.

2. Lacking comprehensive counterinsurgency plan in 2003 and 2004

3. Lacking capacity, such as a court system undermined reconciliation and reintegration.

5. Successful conventional operations against insurgents affect their will to fight similar to Vietnam

6. Continued host nation internal sectarian divisions, made internal political compromise on reconciliation and reintegration almost impossible

7. Without host nation support, reintegration programs on a national level, such as Sons of Iraq, had difficulty succeeding

8. Perceived host nation weakness prevents lasting reconciliation

9. Mixed political and military messages convince insurgents to not reconcile and hedge their futures with Al Qaeda and a future different government

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[280]Ibid.

[281]Ibid., 306.

10. Public differences between the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi government undermined the unity of effort message and portrayed weakness

11. Develop comprehensive doctrine on reconciliation and reintegration, supported by a robust civilian implementation force

The lack of support made the U.S. experience with the Sons of Iraq painful. The Maliki government has been hesitant to this day to fully embrace the reconciliation. There still are many within the national government that do not want to reconcile with the Sunnis. Unfortunately, the current situation is largely due to the effort of the U.S. It is the U.S. through its policies of debathification and democratization that gave power to the Shia political block. The Shia takeover contributed to the resulting civil war. The U.S. attempted to resolve the civil war by addressing Sunni grievances in order to get them to reject and destroy Al Qaeda. The Shia dominated government's reconciliation with Sunnis is ongoing.

<u>Case Study Afghanistan 2003-2010</u>

The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has unique characteristics among current insurgencies, but shares commonality with those in the past. To understand the insurgency, it is important to understand the Taliban and Pashtuns, their culture, history and place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To solve the insurgency, it is useful to look at how Afghan's have solved their differences culturally before.

In planning for reconciliation and reintegration, it is instructive to look at Taliban and Pashtun history, identity, and shaping forces that made them persuasive to follow. The case study will argue the lack of U.S. cultural understanding has caused missed reconciliation opportunities. It will conclude that currently, the Afghan host nation

government does not have the capability, or the security for a national reconciliation program. Currently, it is important to look at NATO and ISAF actions with respect to:

1. Setting the security conditions conducive to reconciliation and reintegration

2. Maintaining the pressure on insurgents to reconcile and reintegrate through targeting

3. Developing a host nation led reconciliation and reintegration plan

4. Maintenance of host nation and external forces unity of effort

5. Maintenance of the host nation and external forces military and political will

6. The effect of lacking reconciliation and reintegration planning

A portion of the Afghan and Pakistani population views the Taliban as valiant warriors, committed religious heroes to a portion of the Afghan and Pakistani population. In the western media, they are an intolerant repressive regime that is culturally backward and unsophisticated. They are the force that permitted Osama bin Laden to operate freely and supported his attack against the United States. The west views the Taliban as an extremist Muslim group that is supportive of Al Qaeda goals. A common misperception is that Afghans and the Taliban are the same. Many of these perceptions are simply not true. The truth is more complicated there are many ethnic and tribal dimensions.[282]

The Taliban is comprised of Sunni Muslim Pashtuns. The Pashtun tribe, historically, has been the largest ethnic subset of Afghanistan that occupies the central,

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[282]Several forces shaped the modern Taliban. Culturally, the Taliban are descended from the ancient warrior culture of Afghanistan reflected in the mujahedeen that fought the Soviets in 1979. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the rise of warlords and madrassa religious ideology influenced the movement. The initial Afghan reception of the Taliban as the "hope of peace for a war weary people" was followed by popular disillusion and the 2002 Taliban downfall. The ensuing insurgency profoundly shaped the group.

southern and eastern portion of the country and comprises 42 percent of the Afghan population.[283] In addition to Afghanistan, ethnic Pashtun tribes also live on the western portions of Pakistan. More live in Pakistan. The Pashtun tribes are fiercely independent and a consensus focused tribal organization that rejects strict authority.[284]

Pashtun history was affected by Russia and Britain as they created buffer zones to their areas of influence in the region from 1839 to 1919.[285] In 1893 a boundary was drawn between British India and Afghanistan known as the Durand Line. It was the initial line that later became the international border of Pakistan and Afghanistan and divided the Pashtun tribes. The Pashtun community was disgruntled by the formation of this line and according to Marston "was correct in suspecting that the location of the line was deliberately chosen to undermine the unity and political power of the community."[286] Furthermore, the British grant of semiautonomous status to the Pashtun area of present day Pakistan gradually evolved into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) after independence in 1947.[287]

The Afghan central authority as embodied by the monarchy maintained differing levels of influence from the mid 19th century, until the early 1970s. Toppling of the

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[283]Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, "The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis," *Military Review* (May-June 2008): 62.

[284]Ibid., 58.

[285]Numerous other invaders from Alexander to the Mongols, the Russians and now the United States with its allies have shaped Afghan history and culture.

[286]Daniel Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead: Afghanistan 2001-2010," in *Counerinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 253.

[287]Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 58.

monarchy and drive for modernity in the 1970s resulted in a backlash within the rural

communities. The communist takeover in 1978 and the Soviet intervention in 1979,

further sparked a larger opposition movement, named the Mujahedeen. The various

Afghan communities, Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazarra, all were part of the

Mujahedeen. The civil war was marked by a rise in warlords aspiring for power.

Afghanistan experienced significant fighting, looting and rape. According to Marston

"the Pashtun community struggled to remain unified, but many of the leaders from the

Soviet War were considered corrupt and power-hungry [and] unfit to lead the community

depending on them."[288] The civil war resulted in a war weary population that was willing

to accommodate in order to achieve some form of security. This atmosphere of insecurity

allowed the Taliban and its ideology to take hold as the peace bringers to Afghanistan.[289]

The Taliban was comprised of Pashtuns from the refugee camps in Pakistan who

were influenced through madrassas in a version of Wahabist Islam. The Taliban claimed

themselves as righteous religious students on the march for peace.[290] The goals of the

Taliban were to "restore peace, enforce sharia law, disarm the population, and defend the

integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan"[291] This message resounded loudly with

many Pashtuns in both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[292]

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[288]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 254.

[289]Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 59.

[290]Ibid., 59-60.

[291]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 255.

[292]Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 60.

Cultural Tradition of Reintegration

The region of Afghanistan and Pakistan has had a rich history of reintegration. The Pashtunwali code incorporates concepts of reconciliation (musaleha) and reintegration. They are the basis to truce (tiga) and forgiveness (afwa). These concepts are also used to reaffirm the traditional establishment of loyalty. The process provides honor by allowing an exit from the conflict with dignity through tribal elder negotiations.[293] Grievance resolution and mediation are vital to the success of an appointed reconciliation broker (Salis ul Khair or Syed) acting as part of a Jirga. The reconciliation is enforced through a series of safeguards.[294] Afghan history is inter-connected and able to minimize conflict through processes codified in the Pashtunwali.

Pashtun culture is important because "while it would be incorrect to refer to the Taliban insurrection or resurrection as merely a Pashtun affair, it would not be far off of the mark."[295] The culture is determined largely by the Pashtunwali code of honor. A Pashtun "must adhere [to] the code to maintain his honor [and] to retain his identity as a Pashtun."[296] The principles of the code are:

1. Badal (revenge)–when violence violates honor revenge is necessary to restore honor

2. Melmastia (hospitality)–hospitality is offered to all visitors without regard or expectation of a return

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[293]Eggers, Interview.

[294]ISAF, 27 June 2010, 3.

[295]Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 61.

[296]Ibid.

3. Nanawatay (to seek forgiveness)–this allows Pashtuns to seek forgiveness for wrongs and to avoid badal

4. Hamsaya (one who shares the same shadow)–the principle that for protection servitude is expected.[297]

This code brings Pashtuns together.[298] Thus, while many clans are economic or political rivals, their tribal culture identity causes them to rally in face of outside threats. They are politically astute and known to engage in complex alliances and counter alliances in order to protect their interests.[299] Reconciliation cannot be successful, if the ethnic and tribal differences are not understood.

According to Thomas H. Johnson "the Taliban wants . . . a return to its pre 9/11 status."[300] The overall strategy is one of patience and is comprised of four phases.[301] They are

1. Mobilize the religious public in Afghanistan and Pakistan

2. Rally the Pashtun tribes through the Pashtunwali code

3. Build confidence in their organization while undermining the government's legitimacy

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[297]Ibid.

[298]Eggers, Interview.

[299]Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 61.

[300]Ibid., 64.

[301]Professor Johnson is the Director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. Under his direction, the program coordinates anthropological research activities on the human terrain of Central and South Asia.

4. Establish an Islamic state after the expulsion of foreign powers, which include southern and eastern Afghanistan and the FATA region of western Pakistan.[302]

On 7 October 2001, the current insurgency started with U.S. aircraft and cruise missile strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets. Special Operations Forces and Northern Alliance, predominantly non-Pashtun, joined to fight the Taliban. The Taliban initially rallied and sent large formations against the United States, United Kingdom and Northern Alliance forces, but these were decimated by coalition air strikes.[303] The Northern Alliance exploited the success and quickly took Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Kunduz, which increased the rapid disintegration of Taliban forces and organization. The Taliban escaped to the mountainous eastern region of Afghanistan in December 2001. Marston notes that "this phase demonstrated how fragile Pashtun support for the Taliban really was, which numerous commanders failed to note in their drive to hunt down and kill Al Qaeda and Taliban forces."[304] The focus on hunting down Taliban alienated Afghans and created insurgents because of heavy handed strikes and searches.[305]

The war in Afghanistan could be perceived conventional in origin with operations in Tora Bora Mountains of eastern Afghanistan. There is little evidence of a reconciliation or reconciliation plan as part of a post combat phase counterinsurgency

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[302]Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 64.

[303]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 258.

[304]Ibid.

[305]AA807, Interview.

strategy in Afghanistan. The U.S. sent a message that it had no interest in reconciliation.

Opportunities that presented themselves were not seized.[306]

Initial operations relied heavily on Northern Alliance soldiers. Thus,

reinforcements were sent to Afghanistan from the 10th Mountain, the 101st Airborne (Air

Assault) and the 82nd Airborne Division. Their mission was "to find, capture, and kill Al

Qaeda and the Taliban leadership"[307] According to Barno "conventional units operated

out of sizable bases such as Bagram or Kandahar . . . they gathered intelligence, planned

operations, and sortied on "raids" . . . intelligence drives operations . . . tactical operations

inevitably remained focused on the enemy"[308] These units were unprepared for

counterinsurgency because they were unaware that an insurgency had started.

In March 2002, the Coalition was unaware of the economic and political

challenges of the Afghan community. According to Barno, Coalition forces employed a

"raid strategy" which along with small number of troops effectively separated the

Coalition from the Afghans.[309] According to Barno "'[t]ossing' whole villages in a

cordon-and-search operation based on an intelligence tip, regardless of its accuracy,

could quickly alienate a neutral or even friendly populace."[310] According to Marston, the

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[306]Ibid.

[307]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 259.

[308]David Barno, "Fighting the other War: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 2003-2005," *Military Review* 87, no. 5 (September-October 2007): 33.

[309]The broad characterization that all insurgents were Taliban or Al Qaida was not true. Some of the insurgents were simply disgruntled Pashtuns that the Coalition had created.

[310]Barno, 33.

effect was that "it took more than five years to recognize and acknowledge that many of the insurgents were fighting for the same reasons that have always motivated insurgencies: economics, politics, perceived wrongdoing, revenge, and tribal or ethnic issues."[311] The Coalition was successful at recreating some of the same conditions that caused the Taliban to succeed after the Soviets.[312]

In December 2001, the effects of the Bonn agreement disgruntled the Pashtun community, highlighting the inability of the central government to attain unity of effort or purpose in its reconciliation and reintegration efforts. The agreement established the Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai who was a Zirak Durrani Pashtun. Many Pashtuns felt the government was heavily influenced by Panjshiri Tajiks, who were suspect because they fought with the Coalition as part of the Northern Alliance and later as the Coalition pursued the Taliban into the mountains. A Loya Jirga "great council" later confirmed Pashtun fears that Tajik influence dominated government, when Tajiks were awarded key security positions in the government. Ahmed Rashid described the situation "Panjshiri [Tajiks] have dominated the army, police, and intelligence services. Their power has caused widespread resentment, especially among ethnic Pashtuns."[313]

The insurgents are chiefly comprised of four groups. These groups are

1. Quetta Shura Taliban led my Mullah Mohammed Omar

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[311]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 260.

[312]The post Soviet occupation was marked by lawlessness and rise of warlords. Similarly, the large amount of foreign money, criminality, insurgency and violence inflamed by lacking government capacity are recreating the environment of insecurity that the Afghans found themselves in before.

[313]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 261.

2. Peshwar Taliban, operating in Kunar province of RC East

3. Haqqani Network, led by Jalaudin Haqqani, operating in RC East

4. Heb-e Islami Gulbuddin, led by Gulbuddin Hekmaryar, operating in RC East.[314]

Reference to the insurgency as Taliban insurgency, would indicate that it is a single cohesive organization, which is not the case. The Taliban are significant, but by no means the only actor in the insurgency. Fotini notes in *Flipping the Taliban* that "the Taliban have long marketed themselves as the Afghan faction most successful at maintaining internal cohesion and avoiding defections."[315] Its alliances were fluid when the United States led war began in 2001. Early realignments were caused by large infusions of United States money to unproven Afghan leaders some who were Taliban, mujahedeen and tribal figures overtures, and promises of honorable positions in the new government.[316]

Starting in 2001 through 2009 the campaign was marked by an ineffective strategy. Factors that contributed to the absence of a strategy were a failed understanding that small insurgencies can happen in multiple locations. The lack of security and economic stability fans insurgencies. An absence of positive government impact on communities it wanted to influence. Many within the Pashtuns community believed that with a Taliban defeat they would lose their stake in Afghan politics and future. Military planners in Afghanistan realized that the lack of a comprehensive campaign plan similar

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[314]Ibid., 264.

[315]Semple and Fontini, 325.

[316]Ibid., 35.

to Malaya and Dhofar undermined the unity of effort. To rectify this challenge planners wrote a counterinsurgency plan in 2004, which evolved into a detailed campaign plan "co-written with the United States embassy and broadly shared by the Afghan and international community." It focused on the "The Five Pillars."[317]

The five pillars were defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary, enable Afghan security structure, sustain area ownership, enable reconstruction and good governance, and engage the regional states.[318] There are two overarching principles to this strategy. The population was now the critical objective to win over, not killing the enemy. The second principle was unity of purpose. The plan called for better integration not only among military and civil organizations, but also the complex military organization that evolved unevenly in Afghanistan.[319]

The efforts in Afghanistan were frustrated by a lack of focus and resources, because they were dedicated to the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq.[320] Strategic planning was underfunded and plagued with leadership changes due to a lack of political will. With the U.S. announcing a projected withdrawal date from Afghanistan in 2014, the U.S. will is questioned by local Afghans.[321]

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[317]Barno, 34.

[318]Ibid., 37-38.

[319]Ibid., 34-35.

[320]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 261.

[321]Ian Simpson, "NATO Afghan exit could mean civil war, Kandaharis say," 28 November 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AR0X120101128 Reuters.

This plan was based on counterinsurgency principles gained by Barno's "own [counterinsurgency] readings and several senior British officers on my staff [who] supplied important operational insights from their Northern Ireland tours,"[322] The result was that from 2003 to 2005, ISAF "shifted towards a more classic counterinsurgency approach familiar to Louis Lyautey, Sir Gerald Templer, or Creighton Abrams."[323] It incorporated past concepts such as "clear-hold-build." The plan, however, was undermined by high turnover in senior leaders with five separate chiefs of mission and six different military commanders-not counting those who served less than 60 days.[324]

Many in Afghanistan experienced several setbacks as well as the continuous threat from the Taliban. President Karzai was under growing pressure from powerful interests inside his own administration. Large scale corruption, crime, poverty, and growing narcotics trade threatened to undermine public confidence in a new democratic government.[325] The strategy of "clear-hold-build" was sound. Unfortunately, the United States effort was not reinforced until 2007 when a second Brigade Combat Team (BCT) moved into RC East.[326] The "clear-hold-build" plan lacked troops to affect security and consistent leadership to accomplish it. The execution of the Afghan counter insurgency reflected that Afghanistan was second priority for resourcing to Iraq.

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[322]Barno, 34.

[323]Ibid., 42.

[324]Hughes, Interview.

[325]Barno, 43.

[326]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 268.

Strategy development from 2001 to 2010 has made progress. The strategy has evolved from a conventional focus to a clear hold build. However, the successes of implementing a "clear-hold-build" strategy similar to Iraq is localized and limited. The bottom up reform process similar to Al Anbar has had limited success. Education in counterinsurgency is improving with allies as they take lessons learned back to their home countries and improve training in preparation for future deployment. However, progress in training, development and resources is uneven among the allies and Other Government Agencies (OGA) working with the Coalition. Not all allies and partners in Afghanistan understand the complex insurgency campaign.[327]

The development of local and national police forces as part of a counterinsurgency strategy is key to providing security similar to Malaya, Dhofar and Vietnam. The issues with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are varied. First, observers question whether Afghanistan has the funding to maintain the size of the Army or Police required to conduct counterinsurgency operations and provide security. The problem was that the local population viewed much of the Afghan National Security Forces as nothing more than thugs.[328] Large amounts of corruption undermined the capacity and capability of the police to provide security to local populations.[329]

Under resourcing of the counterinsurgency campaign has affected the Afghan army as well. The Afghan National Army was developed a little better than the police,

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[327]AA907, Interview; Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 266.

[328]Miller Interview; Eggers, Interview.

[329]AA806, Interview.

but it suffered from inconsistent training as it was passed from one development

organization to another.[330] Lack of qualified advisor teams were a root cause that

prevented the Afghan National Army (ANA) units to stand up. Partnering of International

Security and Assistance Force units with ANA Kandaks increased in 2009. This resulted

in a measurable improvement of "professionalism" among ANA units.[331]

Reintegration and reconciliation was not a priority of the comprehensive

counterinsurgency strategy. In "How to flip the Taliban," "Afghan leaders and their

United States backers have made only half-hearted, ill-funded, and largely futile efforts to

exploit the willingness of the Taliban commanders to switch sides…United States

misguided approach to detention . . . drove people who might otherwise have cooperated

into the insurgency."[332] In its current form, the strategy has created more insurgents than

it "flips." Reconciliation was never a high priority for the Karzai government or

Washington. The Afghan central government, because of its ethnic fracture, could not

build consensus for a reconciliation and reintegration program.[333] The government did

not include all the multifaceted elements of the Pashtun communities.[334]

Early planning is critical to successful reconciliation and reintegration. Forces can

identify facts and assumptions in order to set the conditions for reconciliation. These facts

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[330]AA907, Interview.

[331]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 273.

[332]Michael Semple, and Christia Fontini, "How to Flip the Taliban," *Foreign Affairs* 87 (July/August 2009): 36.

[333]Eggers, Interview.

[334]AA809, Interview.

and assumptions help develop the tentative plan. The tentative plan will outline concepts of reconciliation, who to reconcile with and how to set conditions for reconciliation in the future. With a reconciliation plan, the Coalition could have recognized opportunities to reconcile and reintegrate former Taliban.[335] Instead, opportunities were missed.

In 2002, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, the Taliban foreign minister, approached the Afghan government voluntarily, was arrested and detained at Bagram for 18 months before his transfer into house arrest. Furthermore, Abdul Haq Wasiq, Taliban deputy minister of intelligence and Rahmatullah Sangaryar, senior field commander from Uruzgan, were both arrested after approaching the Coalition and moved to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[336] "Scores of fighters belonging to Wasiq's, Sangaryar's, and Rohulla's networks were once ready to recognize the Afghan government and lay down their arms, but they have not. The message from Washington and its Afghan allies could hardly have been clearer: hold out an olive branch, and you go straight to jail."[337]

Semple and Fotini's argue that reconciliation must be a comprehensive host nation led effort.[338] It serves no purpose to reconcile with the U.S., if the reconciliation

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[335]Planning would also conclude that potentially the reconciliation policies must cover not only the Afghan controlled areas, but also Pakistan. This calls for a much broader unity of effort and calls on U.S. diplomatic and economic forms of national power to make that happen.

[336]Semple and Fontini, 37.

[337]Ibid.

[338]Christina Fotini is Assistant Professor of Political Science at MIT. Michael Semple is a regional specialist focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, with extensive experience dialoguing with the Taliban. Their argument is that sending more troops is necessary but will only have a lasting effect if accompanied by a political "surge," This is a plan to persuade large groups of insurgents to put down their arms and give up the fight. An Interagency white paper on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and

process does not have host nation buy in. Lessons from reintegration experiences in Al Anbar, Iraq underscore this principle. Limited Afghan national capacity and disagreement within the Afghan government cast doubt on the ability of the host nation to develop a reconciliation or reintegration program in a short time. However, with early planning the U.S. could have potentially assisted more.

Another effort launched in 2005, known as the Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation commission was significantly under resourced. The commission aimed to reintegrate former fighters into Afghan society, but gave meaningless certificates to former fighters indicating they had joined the program and should receive protection from harassment. The security forces did not provide the means to protect these fighters from Taliban retribution or eventual harassment by the government. The programs efforts were dismal and in no way contributed to the counterinsurgency effort.[339] The Afghan counterinsurgency was undermined from many aspects. The security forces could not provide security for the population. The lack of priorities and will contributed to a slowed development of both military and police capability. The ethnic fracture and large corruption inside of the Afghan government and in its security organizations undermines its legitimacy and ability to reach consensus and will. The lack of observable progress with security undermines the national will of external forces, such as the U.S. and NATO allies.

Obama's March 27, 2010 speech announcing a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan acknowledged that integrating reconcilable insurgents is key to a military buildup. However, U.S. policymakers have not developed a plan to achieve reconciliation. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65151/fotini-christia-and-michael-semple/flipping-the-taliban.

[339]Semple and Fontini, 37.

The external effort in support of a host nation reconciliation effort must be coordinated. Leaders must develop a Command and Control (C2) structure that delineates the concept of delegated authority. On part of Special Operations forces transparency and unity of effort within and across conventional and a host nation government force is paramount. It is not currently found in doctrine. A recommendation is that subsequent counterinsurgency manuals or Special Operations manuals include sections on how to create command structures in order to support unity of effort and command and control.[340]

Before, the external forces can negotiate with the host nation to identify mutual aims; the external force must ensure the effectiveness of its own chain of command and unity of effort. In the case of Afghanistan the chain of command and unity of effort has been challenging. The process to develop the chain of command and unity of effort as Afghanistan became a NATO mission has never been smooth or efficient.[341] Current perception is that Ambassador Eikenberry is in the lead while General David Petraeus directs security operations. With four serving U.S. ambassadors in Afghanistan, it becomes confusing. For example, currently the USAID reports to the Ambassador for Development Economic Assistance Group (DEAG) who reports to the Deputy Chief of Mission, who reports to the Chief of Mission. Thus, external force command and control and unity of effort is challenging because of the stratified hierarchical bureaucracy.[342] Overall, the current system is effective and can overcome this challenge, since many sub

[340]Senior Special Forces Commander, Interview.

[341]Miller, Interview.

[342]AA809, Interview; AA 806, Interview.

groups, working groups, and committees have developed to focus on specific issues. The confusion arises when there is overlap and duplication of efforts across groups because people are working on similar issues without communicating.[343] This leads to wasted efforts and poor coordination, in addition to personnel frustration. Stress is further increased by a general perception from USAID that current efforts are under a microscope and that tasks must be accomplished well and within time constraints.[344] The stress drives reduced communication and cooperation. The bureaucracies as a result become more stratified as people become defensive. The challenge with a hierarchical, bureaucratic structure is that it does not overcome this challenge quickly. Mistrust across organizations becomes ingrained. As the size of the civilian effort increases, the bureaucracy increases, increasing time and decreasing the focused efforts of individual agencies. The effect is that command and control and unity of effort becomes dysfunctional and undermines the reconciliation effort.

Key to solving some of the bureaucracy challenges are the personalities and leadership skills of senior leaders. According to USIP, although General David Petraeus is in a supporting role to Ambassador Eikenberry, his relationship is more of equals. The same is true for Ambassador Eikenberry. He is able to listen to the security concerns of his senior military commander.[345] The current situation was not always that cordial. Previous commander's unity of command was challenged, even though both civilian and military leadership realized that it was important. According to senior military

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[343]AA809, Interview.

[344]Ibid.

[345]Hughes, Interview.

commanders, the senior civilian organizational culture became hardened. There was a

sense to protect their sphere of influence. The sharing of knowledge and offering of

assistance to solving common external force challenges was dysfunctional. The more

senior the leader the more inflexible he became.[346] Thus from the start it was difficult for

the external forces to offer support to host nation initiatives. It is instructive to understand

some of the reasons for the strain in Afghanistan at the strategic level. General McCrystal

gave the impression that the entire counterinsurgency effort was wrong. This negative

approach to team building did not encourage people from the Department of State to

work with their military counter parts. The surprise too many senior leaders outside of

Afghanistan was that General McCrystal had always been viewed as an integrator, which

was a vital skill in coordinating external force unity of effort and command and

control.[347] The interaction decreased, frictions increased. At the same time there were

petty jealousies that civilian service employees lived in nice accommodations, worked

four days per week, while the military was in a deployed status.[348]

There was a perception that there were different mindsets between the civilian and

military agencies on how to conduct counterinsurgency. What military leaders may have

failed to realize is that the Department of State task of governance is not part of its

training. The Department of State does not have enough people to execute governance

support. It is at best able to provide mentors. The Department of State is significantly

challenged in recruiting the right type of talent to mentor governance. There was a further

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[346]AA807, Interview.

[347]Moyar, Interview.

[348]AA804, Interview.

perception on part of the military that the most talented department of State personnel was not assigned to Afghanistan.[349] The effect was that the military viewed the civilian effort as immature, under resourced and uncommitted. The strain expanded to NATO agencies as well. The U.S. perception was that NATO countries were not pulling their weight and were more work than they are worth.[350] This toxic environment filtered down to lower civilian and military levels. The hope currently is that this toxic leadership environment has changed. Current reports indicate that the relationship between General David Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry are good. Critics worry that General David Petraeus is not meeting with Ambassador Eikenberry as he did with Ambassador Crocker in Iraq.[351] It is unknown if this is a source of potential future friction.[352] Senior allied military leaders view the senior civilian military relationship as vital and the David Petraeus and Crocker relationship as good instructional example.[353]

A challenge for 2010 is the decentralization of responsibility while trying to execute a counterinsurgency strategy. "To accomplish its aim in Afghanistan, the Coalition will need to create an acceptable bottom-up political structure that works within the confines of all the Afghan ethnic communities and is cognizant of their historical traditions and tensions to foster reconciliation and reintegration and workable regional

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[349]AA806, Interview.

[350]Ibid.

[351]Ibid.

[352]Ibid.

[353]AA1013, Interview.

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relationships with Afghan Central Government."[354] The number of different governments involved in the effort, with rules and priorities at times at odds with the counterinsurgency effort, cause considerable confusion. Confusion hampers implementation of a cohesive plan across multiple districts controlled by different ISAF and NATO units.

There is hope for the future. Reintegration alone is not a silver bullet.[355] As the violent conflict continues in Afghanistan, the chances of peace occurring increases every day. Decentralized military and police forces could help develop security, improve governance and address corruption. These measures could improve Afghan confidence and create trust in local government, but also the national central government. Unfortunately, currently, even with external force support, the national government is not able to set the security conditions necessary for reconciliation on a national scale. The effect is that reconciliation and reintegration is bringing an end to violence, but principally because of successes at the local level.[356] This is not a bad development.[357]

<center>Current Afghan Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategies</center>

The United States strategy for AFPAK is to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan, reverse Taliban momentum and deny its ability to overthrow the Afghan

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[354]Marston, "Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road ahead," 285.

[355]ISAF, 27 June 2010, 4.

[356]Senior Special Forces Commander, Interview.

[357]It is possible to have a local reintegration program, but it is difficult to have a reconciliation program that is strategic in scope, without host nation national support. Without national consensus, it is possible to trickle low level fighters back into society. The challenge is the legal status of the insurgent after he reintegrates.

government. Finally, the United States commits to strengthening the capacity of the

Afghan security forces and government so that Afghan government can lead responsibly

towards an Afghan future.[358]

ISAF has three campaign strategies and objectives. ISAF will gain the initiative

by protecting the population in densely populated areas where the insurgency has

dominant influence. ISAF will separate insurgent influence from the populace and

support Afghan government sub national structures to establish rule of law and deliver

basic services. Finally, ISAF will implement population security measures to connect

contiguous economic corridors, foster community development and generate

opportunities.[359]

ISAF has identified some key insurgent weaknesses

1. The enemy includes multiple locally based tribal networks, as well as command

structures, which at times can make decentralized execution difficult

2. Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership persists at the local level

3. The enemy is dependent on many marginalized/threatened segments of the

Pashtun population

4. The enemy is over reliant on external support

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[358]Strategy was taken from a British briefing titled "Progress towards security and stability in AFG."

[359]Campaign Strategy and Strategic Objectives was taken from a British briefing, "Progress towards security and stability in AFG."

5. Insurgent violence against civilians and respected figures is counterproductive.[360]

Currently, the ISAF sees an opportunity for peace. ISAF believes that protagonists have reached a point at which they question if the use of force will defeat their opponent; long period of fighting is reducing their will and the will of their supporters. It is this mindset that provides a starting point for negotiated settlements. "This sentiment is evident in some quarters in Afghanistan from local to national level."[361]

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) Reintegration Currently

> We must find ways to bring those who are disenfranchised back into the fabric of society, economy and policy. We recognize many have suffered - and like all Afghans - seek justice, prosperity, and security. We acknowledge that the economic growth and social progress that has occurred elsewhere in the world has been denied to us. The opportunities and protects to which we aspire, in common with all other nations remain beyond our grasp.[362] Resolution National Consultative Peace Jirga, Kabul

The publishing of the International Security and Assistance Force Reintegration guide, International Security and Assistance Force provided commanders with a wider understanding of the Reintegration program and policies. The purpose was to draw on the principles learned to improve unity of effort between external forces and the host nation. It also serves as a unifying doctrine that is a product of planning. With a national Reintegration Guide, the International Security and Assistance Force attempts to raise the

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[360]Insurgent Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities was taken from a British briefing titled "Progress towards security and stability in AFG."

[361]ISAF, 27 June 2010, 3.

[362]Ibid., 1.

importance of reintegration in the COIN campaign and how International Security and Assistance Force will support the effort. In addition it also serves as a comprehensive plan that supports unity of effort and is perceived as a host nation led initiative. The goal is that commanders then engage community leaders and their Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and ANSF partners to continue to develop understanding, its opportunities and pursue implementation. Key is the mutual support in doctrine that later Ambassador Eikenberry illustrates in his guidance to the ISAF Reintegration strategy.

The current Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) was issued by Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan prior to the Kabul Conference and replaced previously issued Interim Guidance. The APRP reflects the decisions of the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ). It is interesting to note its structure, concept, and functions at the tactical and operational and strategic levels and finally look at the overall objectives.[363.]

Reintegration is a Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan led program supported by International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and UNAMA. The Afghan president is advised by the High Peace Council and directs the Joint Secretariat to execute the program. The Joint Secretariat coordinates subordinate agencies such as MOD, MOI, NDS, and IDLG. The secretariat also provides financial and political support to provincial and district levels.[364]

Reintegration does not just simply happen. Security is fundamental to reintegration. It is security which provides the insurgent with the ability to pursue

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[363]Ibid., 6-7.

[364]Ibid., 5.

integration. Good governance is also vital to an effective reintegration program. Poor governance caused citizens to join the insurgency. The guide draws on earlier Chieu Hoi experiences in Vietnam claiming that it is in the end weariness, the continued threat of targeting and growing desire for peace that motivates the insurgent to reconcile and reintegrate.[365]

Reintegration is not simply a function of improving security and governance; rather it becomes a significant contributor to improving security and governance. As security initially improves, insurgents reconcile and reintegrate. Insurgents leave the battlefield and rejoin their communities. The effect is that fewer insurgents are there to fight, thus increasing the level of security. Hence a positive cycle develops that speeds the long term solution to the insurgency.[366] Thus "as well as being the beneficiary of good COIN, reintegration is also a potential force multiplier by taking fighters out of the fight."[367]

The day to day reintegration tasks are coordinated and executed by the Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees (PPRCs). They are established by the governors and also incorporate representation from MOD, MOI, and NDS, provincial development institutions, tribal and community elders and religious scholars. The PPRC is important to ensuring that reintegration decision making is made below the national level. Thus the

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[365]Ibid., 1-2.

[366]Ibid., 2.

[367]Ibid.

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PPRC also has representatives from International Security and Assistance Force,

Provincial Reconstruction Teams and UNAMA to advise and assist.[368]

As a concept, the APRP is a comprehensive program that promotes long term

justice, governance and development initiatives. The program is available to all citizens

willing to renounce violence and live in peace according to the laws of Afghanistan. At

the tactical and operational level the APRP is focused on local peace processes. The

community elders attempt to benefit all in their community by promoting peace, while

also ensuring that former insurgents are not rewarded.

The International Security and Assistance Force Reintegration Guide notes that

APRP is different from the informal return of the fighter to their village. Informal

returnees have no targeting protection or claim to political amnesty. There is no support

for grievance resolution. Moreover, these informal returnees do not benefit from

education or vocational training, or community recovery packages.[369]

At the tactical and operational level the program focuses on:

1. Outreach

2. Confidence building and negotiation

3. Political Amnesty, not yet defined by Government Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan

4. De-targeting and local security guarantees

5. Transition of Insurgent to Reintegree

6. Release of detainees

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[368]Ibid., 5.

[369]Ibid., 7.

7. Provision of long term support to enable community recovery through education, vocational training, and career opportunities.

The reintegration process is supported by outreach and confidence building designed as the first step in the reintegration process. In addition, informed by outreach and supported by confidence building measures, the reintegration process begins with dialogue. Finally after initial discussions, there is a period of assessment and vetting were reintegree and community concerns are answered, the reintegree is vetted by Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a determination is made at the provincial level whether to accept the fighter for reintegration.[370]

At the provincial level there are key components of the reconciliation and reintegration program. They are:

1. Provincial Outreach

2. Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees

3. District Reintegration Shuras

4. Grievance Resolution

5. Identification of Safe Houses

6. Registration

7. Transition Programmes

8. Employment Opportunities

9. Community Recovery Programmes

Strategically, the APRP is focused on negotiation and mediation with insurgency leadership. The process is complex and politically very sensitive. The process involves

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[370]Ibid., 9-10.

issues such as third country exile, political accommodation, and removal from the United Nations sanction list.[371]

On 30 August 2010, Ambassador Eikenberry published his guidance in support of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. In it he outlines the objectives for the Department of State (DoS) and its challenges.

The objective for the Department of State is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a haven for international terrorists. In order to achieve this, Department of State realizes that their first objective must be to build a state that rejects terrorist sanctuaries, defends against insurgents, is accountable and responsive to the people, and is at peace with the region. Eikenberry realizes that for achievements to be enduring, Afghan institutions must take the lead. This is a key legitimacy principle supporting reconciliation. The second objective of the Department of State is to lay the foundations for a durable peace. The means to accomplish this is through the establishment of institutions that can survive.

Furthermore, Eikenberry defines peace as more than the absence of conflict, but the presence of justice. He recognizes the multicultural complexity of Afghanistan and further defines a peace that "knit[s] together the many parts of Afghanistan's political and ethnic patchwork."[372] Eikenberry's final hope, through justice, is to see democracy and opportunity advance in Afghanistan.

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[371]Ibid., 6.

[372]Karl W. Eikenberry, "All Mission Personnel-Ambassador's Guidance" (Kabul, Afghanistan: Embassy of the United States of America, 30 August 2010).

Civilian efforts must anchor military gains for a long term solution to the

insurgency. There is no military only solution to the insurgency. The military can only

provide continued pressure on insurgents, in order to induce them to reconcile and

reintegrate. Infrastructure and capacity building support security and security promotes

infrastructure building. This dynamic is critical to the reconciliation and reintegration

process. The Department of State must prioritize counterinsurgency objectives and build

the foundations for a political and diplomatic settlement. According to the Department of

State the responsibility for a long term solution belongs to Department of State.[373]

Eikenberry describes the two pronged approach to achieve his goals. There is a

distinct division of labor between military and civilian objectives. This presents a

challenge, in principle, to maintaining unity of effort. It is difficult to maintain unity

across two separate organizations. The civilian effort will lead at the national level

working with the Afghan government. At the same time Department of State will support

the military at the provincial and district levels. As troops secure areas per the

International Security and Assistance Force objectives, Department of State will follow

behind to help Afghan's establish their government. The critical phase in the switch over

period from military to civilian control is maintaining the unity of effort.

It is a joint effort between the military and civilians to protect the Afghan people,

promote a legitimate government, and win the heart and minds.[374] In this case the

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[373]Ibid.

[374]The type of hearts and minds is not defined. It is interesting the mention of hearts and minds. In this case, the definition seems to be a sympathetic will of the populace to support a legitimate government, because it serves in the population's interest in the long run. Does this rule out the British definition of "hearts and minds" in Malaya, according to Markel which advocated resettlement, food rationing, police actions

interpretation of hearts and minds is that Afghan citizens are convinced to support their government, because they trust in the government and it is to their rational advantage to support it as a matter of free choice. The government provides a more favorable choice that supports a citizen's aim based on proven government capabilities, than the insurgencies propaganda to the citizen.[375] Hearts and minds is important, because it is a factor in order to get factions to reconcile and reintegrate

Eikenberry outlines five main efforts. First, the most significant relating toward reconciliation is "Help government earn popular support." Second, he states as imperative that for Afghan's to believe in their government they must see leadership that deserves trust. Third, the principle that reconciliation is a host nation led effort is reinforced. Fourth, he challenges from the village Shura to the national palace, the government to build bonds between grievances and those that vested to address them. Fifth, the government will wind loyalty with actions not propaganda.[376]

Lessons Learned

1. Afghanistan has a rich and complex tribal history that is inter-connected and minimizes conflict through codes such as the Pashtunwali, within the Pashtun areas. Uzbek and Tajik have similar codes, but they are separate.

2. Limited understanding of ethnic and tribal differences undermine reconciliation

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to win the hearts and minds of the population? This is discussed later in the Malaya case study.

[375]Eikenberry.

[376]Ibid.

3. Successful conventional military operations targeting Taliban lacked host nation commitment to develop or lead a reconciliation effort.

4. Poor planning resulted in missed reconciliation and reintegration opportunities early in the war.

5. Host government ethnic fracture and lack of inclusivity prevents consensus for a reconciliation and reintegration program.

6. The current Afghan central government, even with external force support, is unable to set security conditions necessary for reconciliation

7. U.S. 2014 exit plan does reinforce neither political nor military will

8. Development has focused on infrastructure improvements and not capacity building.

9. The lack of a comprehensive reconciliation and reintegration plan has generated disunity of effort between the central government, local provinces and districts.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

While the provision of security is a necessary activity in counterinsurgency, it will not defeat an insurgency on its own. When possible, civilian and military measures should be applied simultaneously to achieve success in an integrated strategy that delegitimizes and undermines the insurgency, builds government control and strengthens popular support.[377]

The United States military cannot guarantee the long term success of a reconciliation or reintegration effort because, it is, fundamentally, a civilian political accommodation. "In counterinsurgency, military forces are enablers for the civil administration; their role is to afford sufficient protection and stability to allow the government to work safely with its population, for economic revival, political reconciliation and external non government assistance to be effective."[378]

The themes used to look at the insurgencies in Dhofar, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan are valuable to planners as guiding principles. The host nation and external forces set the security conditions conducive to enabling reconciliation and reintegration. This principle was vital for Dhofar. It significantly contributed to operational level successes against the Viet Cong in Vietnam. Iraq has made significant progress in developing its security forces. However, this is an area in which Afghanistan struggles.

Insurgents have no incentive to reconcile with a host nation government if they have the advantage. The same is true for fighters. There is little incentive to reintegrate, if there is not some security or economic advantage. Conventional operations with both

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[377]US Government, DOD, DOS, USAID, *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC, 2009), 15.

[378]Ibid.

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kinetic and psychological targeting are critical to change the mindset of the insurgent

leaders and fighters. From the case study in Vietnam, constant targeting of their

personnel and operations was a significant factor in driving Viet Cong to defect.

Currently in Afghanistan, the perceived advantage lies with the insurgents, but that is

rapidly changing in 2011-12. The central government is undermined with minimal

capacity exacerbated by widespread corruption. Currently, the Taliban would gain little

from reconciliation.

Host nation leadership in the reconciliation and reintegration is vital. This is a

difficult task because of several factors. The host nation must generate the political will

to want to reconcile with insurgent groups and reintegrate former fighters. From the

Dhofar case study, in a non-democratic political process it is simpler to generate the

political will to reconcile. Gaining consensus for the process is difficult in an ethnically

divided political environment. It is difficult to achieve compromise in a culture where

compromise may be viewed as indication of weakness. Lacking capacity in the form of

security or a legal system, challenges host nation leadership in reconciliation and

reintegration efforts. The answer may be that the host nations conduct a reintegration

without strategic reconciliation similar to Vietnam.[379] In Vietnam, an existing

government infrastructure, made reintegration of the Viet Cong a success.

The host nation and external forces must maintain the political will to start and

continue to reconcile and reintegrate. The United States must negotiate its own domestic

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[379]Instead of the government adopting insurgent demands through a strategic
reconciliation, the government saps insurgent strength by reintegrating fighters who are
persuaded to ascribe to the government ideology. If this occurs on a large enough scale, it
leaves the insurgency hollow and it collapses.

political landscape that may undermine its own political will to maintain a long term relationship with a host nation. Political will affects military will. A possible mistake was assigning the military too much responsibility in the counterinsurgency effort. The answer may lay in the Department of State and the other forms of National Power, such as economic, diplomatic and informational.

Reconciliation and reintegration are the end game to an insurgency. From the perspective of external forces, a comprehensive strategy that relies on other forms of national power is helpful. The plan must have support from not only the United States and all participating agencies, but most importantly the host nation central and local governments with their subordinate agencies. The military sets the conditions that promote the initiation of the process. Once security achieves significant momentum, long term focus towards the final political solution is passed to civilian agencies within the United States and the host nation

Through this haze of uncertainty, learning lessons quickly and implementing change is critical. An effective counterinsurgency force is able to identify these lessons quickly, analyze them and turn them into best practices.[380] The speed with which change can happen in a counterinsurgency force is critical in executing operational flexibility to the changing nature of the enemy and environment. As the size of force increases, the flexibility tends to decrease. The decrease in flexibility can be retarded with the effective use of technology and organizational design. The fewer levels between the raw data, the resulting best practice and the person that employs the practice, the faster the change. The

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[380]James Corum, "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies" (accessed 10 October 2010), 9-10.

smaller the organization, the less people involved in executing a change, the more consistent the change is throughout the organization. The more consistent the change, the clearer it is to see the effectiveness of a technique derived from a lesson learned.[381]

British advantage in Dhofar was a flatter organizational structure.[382] There are approximately five field grade officers who gather data, analyze and form best practices and doctrine. The U.S. Army is a larger, less flexible and more bureaucratic organization. The technology it leverages does not ensure that the speed of analysis or synthesis of best practices and lessons learned changes. The U.S. Army has developed counterinsurgency schools in both Iraq and Afghanistan with some success. However, the data and lessons learned at times are stuck in theater and only very slowly migrate to the force-generating component in the Army.

Flexibility and adaptability are critical as a conventional army switches from kinetic security operations to operations shaping the environment for reconciliation, reintegration and even amnesty. The army that is unable to make the tactical and operational change will undermine the long term solution to the insurgency and becomes a liability instead of an asset.

The U.S. recognizes that reconciliation and reintegration are elements to end an insurgency. COIN strategy is changing to incorporate reconciliation and reintegration as

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[381]British Major General A. C. P. Kennett, CENTCOM Deputy J5, Director General Training Support and Land Warfare Center, Interview by author, Warminster, England, 20 September 2010.

[382]Daniel Marston, "Lost and Found in the Jungle," in *Big Wars and Small Wars*, by Hew Strachan (London: Routledge, 2006), 97-99.

an element for success. With reconciliation and reintegration embedded in doctrine,

future conflicts may set the conditions sooner to take advantage of its benefits.

APPENDIX A

RESEARCH PROTOCOL

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ART OF WAR RESEARCH
PROGRAM 2010 (PILOT)

10-02 SG 1E   2 AUG 2010

1. General. This research protocol describes the methods for the conduct of primary
   source interviews to be conduct by the eight student members of the CGSC Art of
   War Research project 2010.

2. Training: All students listed below make up the research team. They have each
   received training in the conduct of oral history interviews and understand the nature
   of this protocol and the binding agreement specified in the informed consent
   (enclosure 1).

3. Schedule for Interviews: The class will conduct interviews with respondents in the
   United States and United Kingdom from 5 August 2010 until 15 October 2010. The
   class will be separated into four teams of two students to conduct the interview. The
   interviews will be scheduled in advance.

4. Respondent Criteria: Respondents will be chosen based upon the simple criteria that
   they have served in some capacity, either military or civilian, in a recent
   counterinsurgency effort. Most of the respondents will be military officers and
   commanders, however, the class will make an effort to interview non-commissioned
   officers, civilians, and policy makers as appropriate. Respondents will know in
   advance that they are being interviewed as part of the primary source research for
   CGSC Art of War program. A copy of the information paper (enclosure 2) will be
   presented to each respondent in advance of the interview.

5. Interviewer teams: Each interviewer team of two will work together and alternate
   from interview to interview in the role of interviewer and recorder. Members of the
   team will wear appropriate civilian clothes which will be no more formal than a
   business suit with tie or female equivalent (Slicks) and no less than slacks, dress
   shoes and collared shirt (Smoothes) or female equivalent. The attire will be
   determined by the team based upon the environment and duty day uniform of
   civilians in the area. Interviewers will disclose their rank when asked. The purpose of
   civilian attire is not to deceive the respondent about the rank of the interviewer,
   instead it serves to put the respondent at ease and allow them to speak to the
   interviewer without subconscious concerns about rank.

6. <u>Interviews:</u> Interview teams will try to set up their area prior to the arrival of the respondent. When the respondent arrives and before the interview begins, the team will introduce themselves by name and rank and spend no less than five minutes building rapport. They may discuss the background of the individual and the designated recorder should record the general information provided.

   a. <u>Informed Consent</u>: Before the interview begins the interviewer will present the respondent with the informed consent memo. The interviewer will ask the respondent to read it and then determine the exact nature of disclosure and use of the information provided. Any caveats must be noted and the wishes of the interviewee will be respected and witnessed by both the interviewer and the recorder.

   b. <u>Introduction:</u> The interviewer will begin recording and ask read the following statement: This is interview # _____(Team letter A,B,C,D)_____(Number) recorded at _____(Location). Today's date is _____. The respondent is _____(How we intend to indicate respondent identity. Ie. Commander of a BCT that serve in OIF during 2008.)"

   c. <u>Questions:</u> The team will then proceed with the consolidated list of questions in enclosure 3. The interviewer will allow the respondent time to answer and may interject questions to keep the respondent on topic or encourage rich descriptions and vignettes as necessary. The interview team will also alternate the order of questions in a general rotation in order to ensure that no single research question is always addressed at the beginning, middle, or end.

   d. <u>Conclusion:</u> At the close of the interview, the interviewer will ask the respondent if there is anything else they wish to emphasize or highlight. The interviewer will then stop recording and provide the respondent with a contact business card in case he wishes to follow up with information in the future. Once the respondent has left, the team will review the notes of the recorder, review the recording and improve the notes. No more than 24 hours after the interview, the team will provide an abstract of the interview, the recording data file and the coding information to the CGSC Art of War research project database.

7. <u>Quality Assurance:</u> Quality of these interviews is important to the research, therefore, students will use two forms of quality assurance, team to team, and faculty to team.

   a. <u>Team to Team:</u> The interviewer and recorder will conduct an after action review with another two man team no more than 24 hours after each interview. The other team will review parts of the audio recording and the notes and advise the team on quality and the nature of the questioning. They will identify signs of interviewer bias and comment on perspective and interpretation. Each team will provide feedback to the others. F

   b. <u>Faculty to Team:</u> At the conclusion of a research trip, select faculty will randomly review one interview from each team. The review will be comprehensive and include the audio recording, notes, abstract and database entries. The faculty will

provide feedback for improvement or the elimination of any interviews not conducted properly.

8. <u>Consolidation of Data</u>: Information from the interview and the interview recording file will be stored on a Microsoft Access database that will be accessible on line by only students and faculty of the program. The information will be controlled by the Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency exclusively. The interviews and contents will not be available for any other entity without the express permission of the Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency and the Dean of the Command and General Staff School.

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

CONSOLIDATED RESEARCH/ INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (V.6)
CGSC Art of War Program

INTRODUCTION: The interviewer will begin recording and ask read the following statement: This is interview # ____(Team letter A,B,C,D)_____(Number) recorded at _____(Location). Today's DTG is _____. The respondent is _____(How we intend to indicate respondent identity? i.e. "Commander of a BCT that serve in OIF during 2008.")

A. Pre-Deployment Preparations
1. Describe your organization's mission and how it fit into the counterinsurgency effort. (Ken)
2. What did you and your unit do to prepare for deployment? (Carrie)
3. Describe how you used COIN manuals? (Carrie)

B. Relations with other US Agencies
1. How would you define the command relationship between your unit or parent unit and other US agencies? Describe the relationship? (May prompt, PRT, DOS, USAID, CIA etc) (Ken)
2. Describe your unit's relationship with SOF. (Ken/Jesse)
3. How did JSOA/ROZ affected both SOF and conventional forces? (Jesse)
4. How do you view the role of SOF in COIN campaigns? (Jesse)

C. Relations with Host Nation/ Security Forces Interaction
1. Describe your relationship with host nation security forces (national, regional, and local) and how did you integrate them. (Ken/Carrie)
2. How did your unit or your parent unit coordinate efforts with the host nation government (national, district and or local)? (Ken)
3. How effective was your interaction host nation government, local authorities, and local security forces? (Carrie)
4. Describe specific instances of corruption, how can you mitigate corrupt host nation officials, and what measure have you witnessed at vetting or screening to ensure host nation forces are not infiltrated by insurgents? (Travis)
5. How did you task organize your unit in order to "partner" with host nation security forces? (Mac)
6. Describe the command relationship between the security forces you worked with and the host nation government (nation, district, and local)? (Ken)

7. Did you conduct any special training or education to prepare the Soldiers that would be working with indigenous forces for that assignment? (Mac)
8. Did your preparations/training make your unit better able to employ local security forces? (Carrie)

D. COIN Actions
1. Describe the in-theater training process your unit went though? (Mac)
2. As to Heart and Minds, what did you do to win or control the population? (Matt)
3. Describe how development dollars affected the population's behavior and was a dialogue held with local leaders IOT leverage these projects to achieve US/Host Nation objectives? (Matt)
4. Describe how you used PSYOP (MISO) and IO in your operations? (Travis)
5. Have you witnessed any cases of military deception MILDEC? (Travis)
6. How did your unit convey your narrative (define) to the population IOT gain their support? (Karsten)
7. As to population and resource control, how did you secure or separate the local population from insurgents? (Matt)
8. Did the operational boundaries of your unit or parent unit match the civil boundaries (district, village, city)? (Ken)
9. Did a plan, operation, action, activity, or initiative ever have unintentional positive outcome? (Mike)
10. Was there an amnesty program in your AOR? Describe it? If not, did you observe opportunities for reintegration and reconciliation? (Karsten)
11. Describe the use of turned or flipped insurgents in COIN (use of former insurgents groups to work for the government through incentives)? (Travis)
12. Based on your experience, what do you think amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration should be? What should its end effect be? (Karsten)

E. Lessons Learned
1. Did you do something that was not based in doctrine that had positive results? (Mike/ Carrie)
2. Looking back at the whole deployment, did you ever do something that disrupted, reduced, or nullified insurgent intelligence collection, information operations, C2, fire and maneuver, or leadership? (Mike)
3. What did you feel was the most effective part of countering the insurgency and can you provide any examples that you witnessed? (Karsten)
4. How would you use combat tracking in COIN? (Travis)
5. What would you do differently for your next deployment? And any final comments? (Carrie)

APPENDIX C

PARTICIPATION CONSENT

REPONDENT NAME_____
EMAIL_____

INTRODUCTION

You are invited to participate in a research study exploring counterinsurgency (COIN) from both a Art of War' and a practitioners' perspective. You were chosen based upon the simple criteria that you have served in some capacity, either military or civilian, in a counterinsurgency effort.

This study is being conducted as primary source research to support the efforts of the Command and General Staff College Art of War Program and the researchers' completion of theses for Master of Military Art and Science degrees. CGSC students (O-4 to O-5) have volunteered to compete in a selection process that considered past operational experience, educational background, interest in joining an enhanced educational program, and potential contributions to the seminar. CGSC Art of War completed all Core Curriculum requirements for the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) before starting the research seminar.

This interview is being conducted in accordance with US Army Center for Military History guidelines. Interviews are solely for the purpose of oral history.

RESEARCH PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to define COIN from both a literature and a practitioner's point of view. Literature reviewed by the researchers includes original doctrine, case studies, and classicists' perspectives. Practitioners can provide aspects of their personal experience that will further help to define COIN. Both literature and shared information will be analyzed and compared, with appropriate citations provided.

Ultimately, the ILE Scholars will publish their findings as theses for a Masters in Military Arts and Science for the military's wider use. Your participation will significantly assist in this goal.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

If you agree to participate in this study, I would ask you to participate in an interview and potentially be available for follow-up clarification. The interview will last between one to two hours, and the topics discussed will include themes surrounding COIN. The purpose of the interview will not only address specified questions, but also your personal experiences and perspectives on COIN. You will be free to decline to answer any question. The interview will be recorded to assure accurate transcription of your perspectives. You may decline to be recorded or stop the recording while the interview is in progress.

Because the interview will be shared with eight members of the Art of War Program and their faculty advisors, additional clarification may be requested by one of the researchers. If you agree, you will be asked for contact information (email address, phone number) so you can be reached. Any further contact will follow the same rules of confidentiality as agreed upon before, and will be reviewed prior to any additional contact.

CONFIDENTIALITY

There is some choice regarding the level of confidentiality that will be ensured for this study. Given the high-profile nature of the potential participants, I ask that you choose whether and to what extent you may be identified. There are three possible levels:

_____   <u>No Personal Attribution</u>. Names and organizations of those interviewed *will not be published*. Only contextual criteria will be included for clarity of information (e.g., Commanding Officer of an Armor Brigade; company-grade staff officer for a battalion-sized element). The participant's name and affiliation *will not used on audio files or transcripts* (if identification is made by mistake, it will be deleted from the transcript. Data provided will be identified by a code number. Any quotes or interview excerpts *will not be attributed* to the participant by name or in any way that could lead to identification of the participant. Your unit will not specifically be mentioned. Your tenure in theater may be alluded to in order to provide context (e.g., This officer served in both the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a mature theater in Operation Enduring Freedom.). For clarity, years may be used. Please provide a future date when this restriction can be upgraded:

_____   <u>Partial Personal Attribution</u>. Names and organizations of those interviewed *will be published*. Quotes/excerpts will not be accompanied with a name or information that could lead to identification. Data provided will be identified by a code number. Names or specific affiliations will not be included in any report or publication of the study findings. Please provide a future date when this restriction can be upgraded:

_____   <u>Full Personal Attribution</u>. Names and organizations of those interviewed *will be published* and *quotes will be attributed* to the participant personally, by name and by organization.

Please review the three potential levels of confidentiality and disclosure, and choose one by marking your initials on the blank to the left of the choice you prefer.

In addition, to protect the confidentiality of participants of this study, the master list of names, audio recordings, transcriptions, and notes will be property of the United Stated Government and will reside with the Ike Skelton Chair for Counterinsurgency (Dr. Daniel Marston, please see below for contact information) the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS under appropriate US Army Regulations and Policies.

VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE STUDY

Taking part in this research study is completely voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations with the Command and General Staff College. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

For your protection, you have the right to request that the researchers stop the recording device, discontinue taking notes, etc. Information you provide "off the record" will not be used as quotations in a thesis, but may provide context and/or background for certain topics.

SECURITY

Interviews will be conducted at the UNCLASSIFIED level.

HOW TO GET ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS

You are encouraged to ask questions both before you agree to be in this study and also at any time you need information in the future. Dr. Daniel Marston holds the Ike Skelton Chair for Counterinsurgency at the Command and General Staff College and exercises faculty oversight for this research project. You may contact him directly at any time. He can be reached at daniel.marston@balliol-oxford.com or daniel.p.marston@us.army.mil. Alternately, please call him with questions at (913) 684-4567.

 You may also contact Dr. Robert Baumann, Director of the Command and General Staff Graduate Degree program. He can be reached at robert.f.baumann@us.army.mil or by phone at (913) 684-2752.

STATEMENT OF CONSENT

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and received answers. I consent to participate in this study.

I will be given a copy of this form for my records.

_____

Signature   Date

I have fully explained this research study to the participants, and in my judgment, there was sufficient information regarding risks and benefits, to enable the participant make an informed decision. I will inform the participant in a timely manner of any changes in the procedure or risks and benefits if any should occur.

_____

Signature   Date

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AA610, Division Staff Officer. Interview by Travis Molliere and Carrie Przelski, 17 August 2010.195

AA611, Platoon Sergeant. Interview by Travis Molliere and Carrie Przelski, 23 August 2010.

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AA613, Logistics Advisor. Interview by Travis Molliere and Carrie Przelski, 16 August 2010.

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Fort Drum, New York

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